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ABSTRACT
Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery in spacecraft computation
is the ability of a spacecraft to recover from transient errors using
software techniques alone. Transient errors, typically caused by
high-energy cosmic radiation, are the primary source of error in
spacecraft computation.
The objective of this paper is to present a specific methodology for
employing the Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery techniques.
The methodology has three objectives: to limit the propagation of errors
by performing computations on temporary objects, to detect errors by
providing redundant information, and to correct errors by determining the
appropriate recovery action by interpreting redundant information.
The methodology is an improvement of the approach used on the Intelsat VI
attitude control sub-system, and was derived with the assistance of a
computer simulation of a processor experiencing single and multiple bit
upsets. Various performance metrics are discussed. The metric used to
develop the methodology is the least probability of first-order
catastrophe. A probabalistic analysis of systems using the methodology
is performed. In the analysis, the conditional probability of
catastrophe given the occurrence of an upset and the mean time to
catastrophe are calculated with parameters from the Intelsat VI attitude
control sub-system and with parameters from a possible future spacecraft
control sub-system, both with and without Software Implemented Transient
Error Recovery.
The proposed methodology provides several advantages over previous
approaches. The most important of these advantages are that it is a
structured, standardized approach, capable of recovering from multiple
bit upsets and under most circumstances, it can recover from transient
errors without re-initialization or restarting.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Nancy Lynch
Title: Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science
II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This project was inspired by a presentation on software error
recovery for the Intelsat VI attitude control system made by Ron Obert in
the Summer of 1983.
I would like to thank Jim Yonemoto for his guidance and support
throughout the project. His careful attention to detail was most helpful.
I would like to thank George Hrycenko for his support and concern. I am
especially grateful to all the people who took the time to review the
many drafts of the thesis, including Jim Yonemoto, Ron Obert, and
Prof. Lynch. Lastly, I would like to thank Hughes Aircraft Company and
the Engineering Internship Program at M.I.T. for making the opportunity
possible.
III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
ABSTRACT........................................................... II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT..................................................... III
TABLE OF CONTENTS... ............................................... IV
LIST OF FIGURES...................................................... VII
LIST OF TABLES....................................................... VII
1. INTRODUCTION................................................... 1
1.1 Autonomous Spacecraft Maintenance........................ 2
1.2 Fault-Tolerance......................................... 3
1.3 Need for Transient Error Recovery...................... 3
1.4 Previous Work........................................... 5
1.5 Advantages of New Approach............................... 12
1.6 Type of System Assumed................................... 14
1.7 Overview of Thesis...................................... .. 14
2. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY.......................................... 16
2.1 Introduction........................................... 16
2.2 Discussion of General Techniques....................... 16
2.2.1 Error Propagation Control............................. 16
2.2.2 Error Detection ..................................... 18
2.3 Discussion of Recovery Method.......................... 20
2.3.1 Computation Blocks and Idempotent Sections.......... 20
2.3.2 Additional Considerations........................... 22
2.4 Recovery Software Format............................... 22
2.4.1 Computation Block Format............................... 23
2.4.2 Recovery Block Format............................... 26
2.5 Extending Technique to Real Computations............... 29
IV
3. SIMULATION ANALYSIS ....................................
3.1 Introduction.....................................
3.2 The System Models................................
3.2.1 The Multiple Bit Upset Model..................
3.2.2 The Upset Mapping Model......................
3.2.3 The High-Level Language/Machine Language Model
3.2.4 The Structure/Content Model..................
3.3 Performance Metrics for Recovery Evaluation......
3.3.1 Coverage and Recovery Profile.................
3.3.2 Catastrophes..................................
3.3.3 Time and Space................................
3.4 Discussion of Results............................
4. PROBABALISTIC ANALYSIS..................
4.1 Introduction......................
4.2 Detailed Probabilistic Analysis...
4.2.1 Definitions....................
4.2.2 Failure Classifications........
4.2.3 General Detailed Probabilistic
4.2.4 Intelsat VI ACE Example........
4.2.5 Future Spacecraft Example......
4.3 Register Method...................
4.3.1 Register Method Procedure......
4.3.2 The Worst Case Methodology.....
4.3.3 The Intelsat VI ACE Methodology
4.3.4 The Proposed Methodology.......
4.3.5 The Best Case Methodology......
4.4 Summary of Results................
Analysis.............
4.5 Discussion of Results......................
V
33
33
36
36
36
40
42
44
45
48
48
49
51
51
52
52
54
56
61
65
69
70
73
74
75
76
77
78
.. .. .0
.. 0
.. . . . . . . . . .0
.. . .. . .a
5. CONCLUSION.................................................... 80
APPENDIX
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRANSIENT ERROR RECOVERY....... .. 81
THE SIMULATION PROGRAM DESCRIPTION............................ 87
THE SIMULATION PROGRAM LISTING............................... 92
GLOSSARY..................................................... 123
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................ 136
VI
LIST OF FIGURES
page
Sample Computation Block in Error Recovery Format.................. 24
Sample Error Recovery Block........................................ 28
Simulation System Parameters....................................... 88
Outline of Simulation Program...................................... 91
LIST OF TABLES
page
Intelsat VI ACE Memory Parameters.................................. 72
Future Spacecraft Sub-system Memory Parameters..................... 72
Worst Case Methodology Coverage.................................... 73
Intelsat VI ACE Methodology Coverage............................... 74
Proposed Methodology Coverage...................................... 75
Best Case Methodology Coverage..................................... 76
Probability Of Catastrophe - Intelsat VI ACE Configuration......... 77
Probability Of Catastrophe - Future Spacecraft Configuration....... 77
Mean Time To Catastrophe - Intelsat VI ACE Configuration........... 78
Mean Time To Catastrophe - Future Spacecraft Configuration......... 78
VII
INTRODUCTION
Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery in spacecraft
computation is the ability of a spacecraft to recover from transient
errors using software techniques alone. Transient errors, typically
caused by high-energy cosmic radiation, are the primary source of error
in spacecraft computation.
The objective of this paper is to present a specific methodology
for employing the Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery
techniques. The methodology has three objectives: to limit the
propagation of errors by performing computations on temporary objects, to
detect errors by providing redundant information, and to correct errors
by determining the appropriate recovery action by interpreting
redundant information. It will be assumed throughout this paper that the
methodology will be applied to real-time spacecraft control software.
Control software lends itself well to the structuring required by the
methodology.
The methodology is an improvement of the approach used on the
Intelsat VI attitude control sub-system [14], and was derived with the
assistance of a computer simulation of a processor experiencing single
and multiple bit upsets. Various performance metrics are discussed. The
metric used to develop the methodology is the least probability of first-
order catastrophe. A probabalistic analysis of systems using the
methodology is performed. In the analysis, the conditional probability
of catastrophe given the occurrence of an upset and the mean time to
catastrophe are calculated with parameters from the Intelsat VI attitude
control sub-system and with parameters from a possible future spacecraft
control sub-system, both with and without Software Implemented Transient
Error Recovery.
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The proposed methodology provides several advantages over previous
approaches. The most important of these advantages are that it is a
structured, standardized approach, capable of recovering from multiple
bit upsets and under most circumstances, it can recover from transient
errors without re-initialization or restarting.
1.1 Autonomous Spacecraft Maintenance
Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery is part of an overall
system goal of autonomous spacecraft maintenance (ASM). ASM is an
attribute of a spacecraft system which allows continuous operation
without external control, and performance of its specified mission at an
established level for a specified period of time, even in the event of
failure of one or more of its components. The scope of ASM includes
spacecraft hardware maintenance, navigation and stationkeeping, and
mission sequencing. ASM has applications in military and commercial
satellites, as well as deep-space probes.
In military applications, ASM removes the vulnerability of
telemetry and command communication links by the elimination of their
continuous dependence upon ground stations for maintenance and control.
ASM is useful in extending the availability of commercial
satellites. ASM reduces the operational cost of commercial satellites by
minimizing the manpower and support equipment requirements. ASM can be
used to correct problems in the critical elements of a spacecraft, such
as attitude control and power.
Deep space probes have critical periods (during planet fly-by, for
example) during which a system error could result in mission failure.
Ground support is not helpful due to the long transmission delays between
the ground station and the spacecraft. ASM increases the probability of
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mission success.
1.2 Fault-Tolerance
Autonomous spacecraft hardware maintenance requires that a
spacecraft must continue to operate in the presence of hardware faults.
Fault-tolerance is defined as the ability of a system to perform
correctly in the presence of faults. Although there are techniques for
providing fault-tolerance capabilities on terrestrial computer systems
through redundant hardware, these methods require too much weight, power,
and space for practical usage in most current spacecraft applications.
Present spacecraft provide computer hardware redundancy at the
sub-system level. For example, if a memory unit on an attitude control
computer were to fail, the entire attitude control computer system would
be replaced with a spare. Although this method allows only as many
failures as spares, very few satellite failures have been attributed to
on-board computer failures. However, present satellites have very
limited on-board computing power. Future satellites, many of which may
do on-board signal processing of received signals, will require much more
computing power, which could lead to more computer failures.
1.3 Need for Transient Error Recovery
Autonomous spacecraft hardware maintenance also requires that a
spacecraft must continue to operate in the presence of transient errors.
Although errors caused by transient sources are usually less serious than
errors caused by permanent sources, their greater frequency make them as
important. On present spacecraft, the mean time to permanent failure is
on the order of years, whereas the mean time to transient error is on the
3
order of days.
I do not intend to suggest that transient error recovery is more
important than fault-tolerance or should be done in lieu of fault-
tolerance. Autonomous spacecraft maintenance requires both techniques,
and future systems may try to integrate both approaches. However, given
the state-of-the-art in fault-tolerant computing, and given current
spacecraft reliability requirements, I believe that it is more cost
effective to address transient error recovery.
The known causes of transient error in spacecraft computation are:
1) Single Event Upsets
Single event upsets are caused by high-energy cosmic particles
resulting in an ionized track approximately one micrometer in
diameter for approximately one nanosecond. Because of their small
size, cosmic particles can result in at most one bit flip per
particle.
2) Electrostatic Discharge
Electrostatic discharge is caused by the discharging of large
potential differences generated during a spacecraft eclipse in a
magnetic substorm. Such magnetic disturbances can cause a
spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit to charge up differentially to
a 20-kilovolt range [20]. This problem is capable of causing
permanent as well as transient errors. These transient errors can
result in multiple bit flips.
3) Thermal Noise
Thermal noise has the most effect on corrupting analog voltage of
spacecraft sensors, resulting in multiple bit errors.
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4) Intermittent Hardware Failures
Although errors caused by intermittent hardware failures can be
masked using software techniques, they cannot be repaired using
software techniques alone. Consequently, intermittent hardware
failures are not addressed in this paper.
Several studies have tried to determine the single event upset rate
for various components [3,111. The most common figure used is 1 e -4
upsets/(bit-day). At this rate, a spacecraft sub-system such as the
Intelsat VI ACE with 13 K bits of main memory will experience over one
upset per day on average. No such upset rate data exists for
electrostatic discharge and thermal noise.
1.4 Previous Work
Most of the previous work in fault-tolerant computing has not
addressed transient error recovery [2,4,5,10,17,18,19]. Some authors
have addressed transient errors in the form of intermittent hardware
failures [16,21,22]. Intermittent hardware failures are not addressed in
this paper, since they cannot be corrected using software techniques
alone.
The principle recovery scheme used in this paper is essentially a
simplified variation of the program rollback recovery schemes often used
in database management operating systems [1,6,15]. However, rollback
recovery is used in database management to undo correctly performed
actions in order to eliminate deadlock, which is not a concern in
transient error recovery. In transient error recovery, program rollback
occurs when the correctness of the initial execution of a program segment
is doubtful, which is not a concern in database systems. Consequently,
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many of the ideas used in database recovery schemes are not relevant to
transient error recovery.
All of the error detection schemes used in this paper can be found
in other sources [6,13,14,161. Many of these ideas are currently being
employed on the Intelsat VI attitude control sub-system developed by Ron
Obert at Hughes Aircraft Company [141, which is described below.
Summary of the Intelsat VI ACE Transient Error Protection
The goal of Intelsat VI ACE transient error protection is to make
the ACE operation immune to single event upsets. The ACE hardware is
assumed fixed, so only software solutions are considered.
The main idea to the Intelsat VI ACE approach to transient error
protection is to take advantage of fact that 1) the attitude control
system is greatly oversampled, resulting in a natural immunity to error
and 2) the majority of processing time is spent in a wait loop, which can
easily be made immune to most upsets.
The important recovery techniques used in the Intelsat VI ACE are:
Jump return to wait loop:
Jump return to wait loop is a method for detecting and
recovering from sequencing errors which occur during the
execution of the wait loop. The control program of the ACE
sub-system will spend the majority of its run-time in a wait
loop. Since wait loops are short, the number of mutations of
the wait loop instructions that a single bit flip could cause is
small. Here is an example of what could be done:
6
; program fragment
104 add rl, r2
105 jmp 107
106 jmp 200
107 continue...
; wait loop
200 ei
201 jmp 200
202 jmp 200
Suppose an SEU changed line 200 from enable interrupt to jmp 106.
Under normal operation, it is impossible for the program to
execute line 106, since it is intentionally by-passed by line
105. Consequently, embedding a jump return to the wait loop
instruction would recover from such an upset.
Since the amount of time spent in the wait loop is large, this
method is very effective in recovering from SEUs, but is
ineffective in recovering from larger upsets since mutations of
only one bit are considered.
Sequence control codes (SCC):
The testing of sequence control codes is used as a method of
sequence error detection. A variable is set to a known value
before a section is entered. This variable is then checked at
the end of the section. If there is a discrepancy, entry into
the section must have been at some point other than the proper
entry point of that section. If such a sequence error is
detected, the computation is aborted, and the program jumps to
the wait-loop. No method is used to prevent error propagation.
Consequently, the SCC tests had to be used with a high density
to be effective.
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Error-Correction Mode Algorithm (ECM):
The Error-Correction Mode is an alternate mode of operation
which goes into effect when the difference between the actual
output and the estimated output is greater than some margin.
With ECM enabled, the ACE will use the average of past outputs
for 10 seconds while the system re-initializes.
Protected program sections:
By placing important calculations which must be performed with
each real-time interrupt at the beginning of the control loop,
the protected program sections have an increased probability of
successful execution.
Redundant storage and voting of critical parameters:
Redundant storage protects critical parameters from memory
upsets.
Hamming error-correction codes with periodic update:
Error correction codes prevent bit flip errors in main memory.
Periodic register updating reduces the probability that two
upsets occur in the same word.
A simulation analysis was conducted to measure the effectiveness of
the transient error protection. The actual flight code was executed on a
2901 and 2910 simulator, which is capable of arbitrarily flipping
individual bits. The simulation model contained a total of 243
flip-flops, 223 in the 2901 and 2910, and 20 in the remaining hardware.
Each bit was flipped twice at a random time within a 2 second processing
interval. The 486 bit flips correspond to several missions' worth of
SEUs in the processor. Main memory upsets were not considered, since
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error correction codes provide sufficient protection against single
event upsets. The criterion for system failure in the simulation was
observing an output error of greater than 0.003 degrees.
The results of simulation analysis were 1) The placement of SCC
tests within the flight code had little effect in results, 2) Without the
ECM, an average of 6.33 pointing errors of greater than 0.003 degrees
were observed from 486 trials, giving 1.3 % probability of failure,
3) With the ECM, an average of 2 pointing errors greater than 0.003
degrees were observed from 486 trials, giving 0.41 % probability of
failure, 4) Only active processing time was simulated. Results should be
factored by (1 - timeinwaitloop) to take wait-loop immunity into
account, and 5) The probability of system failure by upset is dominated
by three unprotected flip-flops.
Another system which uses many of the error detection schemes used
in this paper is the DC-9-80 Digital Flight Guidance System developed by
Sperry Flight Systems [16]. The major difference between the proposed
system (as well as the Intelsat VI ACE) and the DC-9-80 is that the
DC-9-80 system uses both hardware redundancy and software self-monitoring
techniques to detect transient errors and hardware failures, whereas the
proposed system uses only software techniques to recover from transient
errors.
Summary of the DC-9-80 Digital Flight Guidance System
Transient Error Detection
The principle concepts in the DC-9-80 approach to transient error
detection are : 1) use a series of error detecting "screens" to monitor
the correctness of program execution. The screens are redundant in the
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types of errors they monitor, so if one screen fails to perform correctly
for any reason, the remaining screens can insure correct execution.
2) create a hardware and software structure that simulates two separate
computers while using only one processor. These "virtual" computers
execute the same software, but use different memory blocks, different
sets of data, and different sensor inputs.
The important error detection techniques used in the DC-9-80 Digital
Flight Guidance System are:
Redundant Storage:
Dual storage of critical parameters is maintained in separate
memory banks. Estimates of "correct" values are made by
averaging the two values, except when the discrepancy between
the values exceeds specified criteria.
Processor Self-Monitoring Program (BITE):
This program executes the entire processor repertoire each
iteration of the flight-program. It tests the processor's
instruction set using a full range of test numbers, tests all
cases of the branching instructions, and uses the internal bus
structure and associated registers at their maximum data rates.
Redundant Computation:
The main function of redundant computations is to guard against
transient errors. All critical computations are performed twice,
using different sets of data stored in entirely different
sections of RAM. Estimates of "correct" values are made by
averaging the two values, except when the discrepancy between
the values exceeds specified criteria. If a transient error
were to occur during the performance of one of the calculations,
10
it would be detected unless a similar transient error occurred
during the performance of the other calculation.
Reasonableness Checking:
When a variable is known to have some range of correct values,
then the actual value of the variable can be compared to this
range to check the reasonableness of the value. If a
discrepancy is found, an error has occurred.
External Hardware Monitor:
The external hardware monitor is similar to the watch-dog timer
used on the Intelsat VI ACE. At the end of each control loop, a
signal to the external monitor is pulsed, which results in a
steady stream of pulses during normal operation. An
interruption in these pulses indicates computer malfunction.
The external monitor itself is tested by the computer during
power-up initialization.
Hardware Monitoring:
Redundant sensors are used, in addition to sensor reasonableness
checking. The rate-of-change of sensor readings is compared to
a predicted maximum rate-of-change.
The A/D and D/A converters are tested by applying the D/A to a
test word, and then applying the A/D to the results. Transient
A/D errors are detected the same way as sensor errors.
Ticket Checking:
Ticket checking is used as a method of sequence error detection.
A "ticket" is a word which contains information indicating the
order the subroutines must be executed. Ticket checking is
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similar to the sequence control code technique used on the
Intelsat VI ACE.
The strength in the DC-9-80 system is its ability to detect both
permanent and transient errors. An error would have to by-pass several
screens before resulting in a system error. The DC-9-80 system's main
shortcoming is that little emphasis is placed upon error recovery. If
an error is detected, the sub-system is simply shut down and replaced by
a spare. Also, no method is used to prevent error propagation.
1.5 Advantages of New Approach
The approach used by the Intelsat VI ACE addresses single event
upsets on a specific system, and takes advantage of specific system
characteristics. Consequently, this approach cannot be easily applied to
other spacecraft systems. Furthermore, it is largely ineffective in
recovering from transient errors other than single event upsets and it is
capable is good performance only in small systems (small programs, few
critical modules and variables).
The approach used by the DC-9-80 avoids most of the problems of the
Intelsat VI ACE recovery technique. However, the DC-9-80 does not have
robust recovery procedures. If an error cannot be corrected by redundant
computation or redundant storage, the only course for recovery is
shutting down. Clearly, this approach cannot be used effectively in
autonomous spacecraft applications.
The methodology presented in this paper avoids these problems by
requiring a specific structure of the flight software and it uses the
attributes of this structure for error recovery. This structure can be
applied to a general class of control programs used in spacecraft
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computing (see the next section for details.) Furthermore, most of the
techniques used in recovery are effective on multiple bit upsets. Some
additional advantages of the methodology are 1) it offers a standardized
approach to transient error recovery for control programs, 2) it does not
require re-initialization to recover from errors in most cases, 3) it has
safeguards to limit error propagation, and 4) it establishes objective
criteria for evaluating the performance of error recovery.
The proposed methodology borrows many error detection methods from
the Intelsat VI ACE error recovery approach. Where the two techniques
differ most is in error propagation control and error recovery strategy.
The error recovery concept for the Intelsat VI ACE could be described as:
"if in doubt, jump to the wait loop". The error recovery concept in the
proposed approach is: "if in doubt, re-execute". The advantages of this
error recovery technique are : 1) the program will always make progress,
or at least never lose ground, in a burst of upsets, and
2) reinitialization is usually not required for recovery. The Intelsat
VI ACE does not address error propagation control.
It should be emphasised that this is a thesis on a methodology for
employing software implemented transient error recovery techniques
effectively on a class of real systems, and not a thesis on the
techniques themselves. Although most of the recovery techniques used in
this paper are well known, any methodology used to employ them in an real
system is either non-existent or vague. For example, McCluskey [131
describes redundant computation by stating "Execute a program a second
time and compare results." How does one do this on a real system? What
about the outputs, the side-effects of the program on the program state,
etc? How does one compare the results? Although McCluskey is certainly
not attempting to describe a methodology for error detection through
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redundant computation, this description is typical in the extent to which
any sort of methodology is described.
1.6 Type of System Assumed
It will be assumed throughout this presentation that the
methodology will be applied to an interrupt driven, real-time spacecraft
control sub-system. Control software lends itself well to the
structuring required by the methodology. Additional system
characteristics which are helpful but not essential are : 1) constrained
program execution flow (to facilitate program sequence monitoring),
2) idempotent outputs (to facilitate error recovery), and 3) a large
amount of available execution time (to allow for transient error recovery
execution overhead).
1.7 Overview of Thesis
There are four chapters in this presentation. The first chapter
describes the specific methodology proposed. It includes a discussion
on the approach, the specific techniques used, and the practical
application of the techniques. The second chapter describes the
simulation analysis made on a program written using the proposed
methodology. This chapter includes a discussion on the simulation models
and assumptions, the simulation performance metrics, and a discussion of
the results. The third chapter is a probabalistic analysis of the
results of the simulation. In this chapter, the probability of failing
to recover from transient errors is computed for both present and future
spacecraft configurations. The final chapter is a summary of the
results.
14
Many terms used in this presentation were originated by the author.
Consequently, a glossary is included to assist the reader in
understanding this document.
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PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
2.1 Introduction
There are three main aspects of Software Implemented Transient
Error Recovery: limiting the propagation of errors, detecting errors,
and taking appropriate recovery action upon error detection.
Error propagation control is achieved by performing complicated
calculations on temporary variables. Once a calculation is complete, an
error detection process is performed to verify that the calculation is
correct. The calculation is then committed, either by changing the
program state or performing an output. Error detection is achieved by
imbedding redundant information in the program state. Inconsistent
states imply the existence of errors. Error recovery is achieved by
structuring the program so that the redundant information can be used to
determine the appropriate place to resume program execution. By
requiring idempotent program sections, the error recovery routine can
re-execute a section whose proper execution is doubtful.
This methodology is designed to recover in the presence of single
and multiple bit upsets per word. This methodology is also designed to
recover in bursts of upsets. The recovery procedure attempts to make
progress in program execution during a burst of upsets, and will restart
only as a last resort.
2.2 Discussion of General Techniques
2.2.1 Error Propagation Control
Error propagation control is an important problem in transient
error recovery. If a value which has been upset is used in a calculation,
all values which depend upon the upset value will be incorrect.
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Consequently, one upset value may result in several incorrect values, all
of which must be corrected to successfully perform recovery.
A process experiencing transient errors can be considered to be two
processes, the actual process and the transient error process. The main
objective of error propagation control is to make all actual process
transactions appear atomic with respect to the permanent program state.
Atomic actions are traditionally used in data base concurrency
control [9]. The objective of atomic actions is to make actions appear
indivisible, that is, all other actions appear to have occurred either
before or after an atomic transaction. Furthermore, atomic actions
appear to have completely happened (commit) or have never happened
(abort). By using atomic actions in transient error recovery, it is
possible to insure that all transient errors occur either before or after
an action but not during.
To limit error propagation, all intermediate and final results of a
computation are stored in temporary variables. This technique insures
that all errors that occur during a computation have no effect on the
permanent program state. Once a computation has completed, its
results are checked by various error detection techniques. If the
results pass the error checking, they are committed by an atomic action
either by assigning a variable which is part of the permanent program
state (known as a critical variable) or by performing an output action.
Thus, the atomic action is essentially a boundary which errors cannot
penetrate. If the results fail the error checking, they are thrown away
and the calculation is repeated until the results pass the error checking.
17
2.2.2 Error Detection
The main concept in error detection is to create redundant
information in the program state and check for inconsistencies. If an
inconsistency is found, an error has occurred. The error detection
techniques used are:
1) Redundant computation:
A single processor experiencing only transient errors can
verify its computations by repeating a computation until an
agreement is reached. This is a very powerful technique since
the majority of active processing time is spent performing
computations.
2) Redundant storage:
Replicated storage of important values (critical variables).
Voting is used to determine the correct values.
3) Memory coding:
Error-correcting codes to correct single bit errors in RAM
storage.
4) Reasonableness checking:
Reasonableness checking is a method of data error detection.
When a variable is known to have some range of correct values,
then the actual value of the variable can be compared to this
range to check the reasonableness of the value. If a
discrepancy is found, an error has occurred. Reasonableness
checking is extremely powerful when the range of correct values
is small compared to the range of possible values.
18
This technique is especially useful for testing program control
variables. For example, suppose we have the following code:
index := 0;
while index < 4 do
begin
index : index + 1;
{ etc. }
end;
We know that at the end of this block, index must have the value
4. We also know that during the execution of this block, index
cannot have a value of less than 0 or greater than 4. Although
this is obvious, this example shows that the implementation of
reasonableness checking can be made very precise.
Reasonableness checking is similar to a process used in program
correctness verification called "assertion checking" [12].
5) Sequence control codes (SCC):
The testing of sequence control codes is used as a method of
sequence error detection. A variable is set to a known value
before a section is entered. This variable is then checked at
the end of the section. If there is a discrepancy, entry into
the section must have been at some point other than the proper
entry point of that section.
6) Jump return to wait loop:
Jump return to wait loop is a method for detecting and
recovering from sequencing errors which occur during the
execution of the wait loop. The control program of a typical
spacecraft sub-system will spend the majority of its run-time in
a wait loop. Since wait loops are short, the number of
mutations of the wait loop instructions that a single bit flip
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could cause are small. Code is imbedded to cause all jumps out
of the loop resulting from a mutated instruction to be followed
by a return to the wait-loop.
2.3 Discussion of Recovery Method
Once an error has been detected, appropriate recovery action must
be performed. The key idea to error recovery is to structure the code
into re-executable sections and provide redundant information to
determine where to continue program execution.
2.3.1 Computation Blocks and Idempotent Sections
To apply the transient error recovery technique to a control
program, the control program must first be divided into computation
blocks, which are similar to procedures. Each block is associated with
either a critical variable(s) or an output operation or both. The
assignment of the critical variables or the output operation is to
be done as an atomic action.
Critical variables are program variables which have a direct effect
upon some output of the system. Non-critical variables have effect on
the output of the system, but only through their effect upon critical
variables. Another way of looking at this distinction is that if there
were only a single copy of a critical variable, and if that copy were
upset, the only possible course for recovery is re-initialization and
restart. If a non-critical variable is upset, recovery can be achieved
through re-execution of a section(s), so complete restart is not
necessary. Since critical variables are actually stored in triplicate,
recovery can be performed by voting on their value. Examples of critical
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variables in the Intelsat VI ACE are offset pointing values, system
modes, and gains. Examples of non-critical variables are counters, flags,
and loop variables.
Each computation block is divided into three sections. The
initialization section performs any initialization required to execute
the block. At the very minimum, each of the critical variables, which
are stored in triplicate, must be voted upon and temporary variables must
be initialized. The computation section performs the computation. The
computation is performed using temporary variables. The computation is
performed at least twice, until two results in a row agree. The action
section assigns the calculated temporary variables to the critical
variables or performs an output operation using an atomic action.
The intention of the computation block/critical variable relationship
is to protect critical variables and outputs from upsets and to allow
simple recovery through re-execution of idempotent sections. The
protection from error propagation arises from the fact that the
initialization section and the computation section do not modify the
permanent program state, since both sections modify temporary variables.
The voting process performed on critical variables by the initialization
section does not change the value of critical variables, it simply
removes errors. Consequently, if an error detection mechanism were to
find an inconsistency in the initialization section or the computation
section, recovery simply involves re-executing the correct section.
There is no need to undo a previous action. The action section does
modify the permanent program state. However, since the run-time length
of atomic actions is very short compared to the run-time length of a
computation block, the probability of mishap during the execution of an
atomic action is small.
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A section is idempotent if the result of multiple applications is
the same as the result of one application. Consequently, a simple
recovery rule that can be used on idempotent sections is: "if in doubt,
re-execute". The initialization block and the calculation block are
always idempotent, since their execution does not modify the permanent
program state. Unfortunately, not all output action sections are
idempotent. The only solution to this problem is to require that
spacecraft output be in absolute instead of relative terms. For example,
"move the platform to 135 degrees" is an idempotent instruction. The
instruction "increment platform position + 15 degrees" is not idempotent.
2.3.2 Additional Considerations
A summary of additional programming rules, many of which are
unrelated to the methodology but are important to minimizing the effects
of transient errors, is given in the appendix.
2.4 Recovery Software Format
In this section, the specific structure for both the computation
block and the recovery block are presented. The code structure presented
is the actual code structure determined from the simulation program. The
computation block structure embodies the error recovery concepts
presented above. The most important observation to make is how the error
detection techniques are used to interface the initialization,
computation, and action sections. For the methodology to achieve full
effectiveness, these section interfaces, with the corresponding recovery
block, must be implemented exactly as presented, since the coverage of
the error detection mechanism is a primary factor in determining the
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system's ability to recover from errors.
2.4.1 Computation Block Format
Figure 1 shows the computation block recovery format developed for
Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery. This code segment
represents one computation block. The block is divided into an
initialization section, a computation section, and an action section.
Each section is joined by a sequence control check, where the old
sequence control code is verified and the new sequence control code is
set. The initialization section simply votes on the critical variables
and initializes the local variables. The computation section performs
its calculation using temporary variables until two results in a row
agree. The result is then checked for reasonableness. The critical
variables used in the calculation are rechecked to insure that the result
was computed from correct data.
The action section in this example updates several critical
variables. The control variables and temporary computation variables are
then checked for reasonableness. Since updating variables is an
idempotent action, the action section meets the idempotent requirement.
The atomicity requirement is also met, but in a subtle manner. The
recovery block will re-execute the action section until both the
reasonableness check and the SCC check pass. Continuing program
execution to the next computation block is the atomic action which
commits the action.
Additional recovery measures, such as Jump Return to Wait Loop
error detection and NOP buffering to prevent mis-interpretation of
machine code (see Appendix) would have to be implemented last. Memory
error correction codes are standard equipment in spacecraft hardware.
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Sample Computation Block in Error Recovery Format
procedure sample-procedure;
{ note : sc = sequence check
rc = reasonableness check
scc = sequence control code }
begin
{section 1 - initialization}
if scc = {last scc} then
begin
scc := (scc 1}
end
else
begin
errorrecovery (sc, scc, blocknumber, section 1);
end;
{vote on critical variables}
variablenumber := 0;
while variable number < number of critical variables do
begin
variablenumber := variablenumber + 1;
{ vote on critical variables }
end;
{initialize other variables }
{section 2 - perform calculation}
if scc = (scc 1} then
begin
scc := {scc 2};
end
else
begin
errorrecovery (sc, scc, blocknumber, section 2);
end;
repeat
{perform computation on temporary variables }
until { two consecutive results agree }
{check reasonableness}
if {temp result is not within a reasonable range of results } or
{if critical variables no longer agree) then
begin
errorrecovery (rc, scc, block number, section 2);
end;
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(section 3 - assign critical variables}
if sCC = {scc 2} then
begin
scC := {scc 3}
end
else
begin
errorrecovery (sc, scc, blocknumber, section 3);
end;
{update critical variables}
variablenumber := 0;
while variablenumber < numberofcriticalvariables do
begin
variablenumber := variablenumber + 1;
copy number := 0;
while copynumber < number of copies do
begin
copynumber := copy_number + 1;
criticalvariable (variablenumber} [copynumber]
:= temp_result [variable number, 11
end;
end;
{ reasonableness check }
if (variablenumber <> numberofcriticalvariables) or
(copy-number <> numberofcopies) then
begin
errorrecovery (rc, scc, blocknumber, section 3);
end;
{ reasonableness check }
if (tempresult [01 <> temp result [1]) then
begin
errorrecovery (rc, scc, blocknumber, section 4);
end;
{ scc check }
if scc <> (scc 3}
then
begin
errorrecovery (sc, scc, block number, section 4);
end;
end;
Figure 1
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2.4.2 Recovery Block Format
Once an error has been detected by a reasonableness check or a
sequence control check, recovery action is performed by the recovery
block. The redundant computation, redundant storage, memory coding, and
jump return to wait loop error detection techniques all recover from
errors in the detection process. Figure 2 shows the recovery software
format.
Although the recovery block could simply reset the system, there is
usually enough information to determine the location of the error and
redo the appropriate section. The trick is to perform a reasonableness
check on the sequence control code. If the sequence control code is a
reasonable number, then there is a very high probability that it is
correct. Since the sections are idempotent, the program can continue
execution at the section which assigned that SCC.
The recovery procedure is divided into seven cases
case 1 : scc check failed and scc is reasonable
RECOVERY ACTION - sequence was upset, continue from old scc.
case 2 : scc check failed and scc is not reasonable
RECOVERY ACTION - SCC register was upset, reset scc and continue.
case 3 : reasonableness check failed at end of computation block and
scc is reasonable
RECOVERY ACTION - reset scc to scc of last block, section 3.
redo current block.
case 4 : reasonableness check failed at end of computation block and
scc is not reasonable
RECOVERY ACTION - re-initialize and restart at block 1,
section 1.
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case 5 : reasonableness check failed at end of action block and scc is
reasonable
RECOVERY ACTION - local variable upset, redo action section.
case 6 : reasonableness check failed at end of action block and scc is
reasonable
RECOVERY ACTION - temp variable upset, redo current block.
case 7 : reasonableness check failed at end of action block and scc is
not reasonable
RECOVERY ACTION - re-initialize and restart at block 1,
section 1.
If the SCC value is not reasonable (cases 2,4,7), the recovery
action depends upon whether the error is found by a reasonableness check
or an SCC check. If the error was found by a reasonableness check, then
the section has performed incorrectly, and there is no redundant
information ( a correct SCC ) to determine where to continue program
execution. Consequently, a complete restart is necessary.
If the error was found by an SCC check, it is safe to assume that
the SCC register itself was upset and that program execution up to the
error detection was correct. This is true because the SCC checks
follow reasonableness checks in sections 2 and 3. Consequently, if
program execution was incorrect, it would have been detected by the
preceeding reasonableness check.
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Sample Error Recovery Block
procedure sample errorrecovery ( type : sc or rc ; currentscc,
current block, currentsection : integer);
{ note : sc = sequence check
rc = reasonableness check
scc = sequence control code }
begin
if (type = sc} then
{ sequence upset detected }
begin
if reasonablescc (currentscc) then
(sequence upset - continue from the old scc}
begin { case 1 }
goto (beginning of currentblock, currentsection};
end
else
{ scc upset - reset scc and continue at scc }
begin { case 2 }
scc { scc of currentblock, currentsection }
goto { end of currentblock, currentsection }
end;
end;
if {type = rc and section = 2} then
{ reasonableness check at end of computation section }
begin
if reasonable_scc (currentscc) then
{continue from current block, section 1}
begin { case 3 }
scc := {scc of previous block, section 3}
goto {beginning of currentblock, section 1}
end
else
{catastrophe}
begin { case 4 }
{re-initialize and restart }
end;
end;
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if (type = rc and section = 3} then
{ reasonableness check at end of action section}
begin
if reasonable_scc (current_scc) then
(redo action section}
begin { case 5 }
goto (beginning of currentblock, section 3}
end
else
(catastrophe}
begin { case 7 }
(re-initialize and restart }
end;
end;
if (type = rc and section = 4} then
{ reasonableness check at end of action section}
begin
if reasonablescc (currentscc) then
(redo block}
begin { case 6 }
scc := (scc of previous block, section 3}
goto (beginning of currentblock, section 1}
end
else
(catastrophe}
begin { case 7 }
(re-initialize and restart }
end;
end;
end;
Figure 2
2.5 Extending Technique to Real Computation
The test program for which the error recovery methodology was
developed bears little resemblance to actual flight code. Here are some
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additional details that should be addressed concerning the application of
the methodology to real spacecraft computations.
Structure of Software
As stated previously, it has been assumed throughout the discussion
that the methodology would be applied to real-time, interrupt driven
spacecraft control sub-system. It is not clear if the methodology can be
applied to arbitrary program structures. For example, it is assumed that
an interrupt driven system has inherent protection from infinite loops,
in that as long as interrupts are enabled, there can be no infinite loops.
For another example, it is assumed that program flow is deterministic, so
the previous sequence control code is always known. This assumption is
not true for arbitrary program structures.
The Idempotence Requirement
It has also been assumed that all output actions can be made
idempotent, that is, the result of multiple applications of an output is
the same as the result of one application. What is the impact if this
requirement cannot be achieved?
The problem is that it is impossible to perform recovery on
non-idempotent action sections. However, action sections compose only a
small percentage of the total run-time (this is the major reason for
using atomic actions), so the probability of needing to recover during
the execution of an action section is low. Consequently, Software
Implemented Transient Error Recovery still works, but at slightly
degraded performance. The amount of performance degradation depends upon
the run-time duration of the non-idempotent action sections.
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Space Considerations
Although the recovery format is rather large, the size of a block
is invariant with the actual computation code. The same basic recovery
format can be used with any computation. Consequently, the memory
requirement for code using Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery
should be comparable to the memory requirement for code not using any
error recovery.
Time Considerations
The real execution time of code using Software Implemented
Transient Error Recovery should be about twice the execution time for
code without any error recovery in the absence of upsets. In the
presence of upsets, the execution time increases even more. Since most
spacecraft control programs spend the majority of their execution time in
a wait loop, the additional time requirement should not be important.
Real-Time Considerations
It is difficult to perform redundant computation error detection
on time varying computations, since the correct results change with time.
To apply the redundant computation error detection technique to time
variant computations, the difference between computations would have to
be compared to some predetermined margin. For example, it may be
reasonable to say that the results of two consecutive time-varying
calculations should agree within a 5% margin. Even in a time-varying
environment, redundant computation is still a very powerful error
detection technique. To see why, lets examine the possible outcomes:
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1) Two correct calculations agree
2) Two correct calculations disagree
3) One correct calculation and one incorrect calculation agree
4) One correct calculation and one incorrect calculation disagree
5) Two incorrect calculations agree
6) Two incorrect calculations disagree
Case 2, although not desirable, is not a problem assuming that
further correct calculations will agree within the margin. Case 3 is
also not a problem for control applications, since the result is
correct (within the margin). The only case that is a problem is case 5.
However, the probability of two incorrect results being within 5% of
each other is very slight if the cause of incorrectness is transient
errors. All other cases perform correctly.
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SIMULATION ANALYSIS
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is an overview of the simulation program used to help
develop the methodology for Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery.
This chapter describes the models used, the performance metrics used, and
the simulation results. For a detailed description of the simulation
program implementation, see the appendix.
Objective of Simulation
The original objective of the simulation was to perform an efficacy
and trade-off analysis of the various recovery techniques. The concept
was that a programming methodology could be developed by considering each
recovery technique individually, without strong consideration of the
relationship between the methods. There seemed to be potential overlap
between their recovery capabilities, and using all the techniques in a
haphazard manner would be wasteful.
However, three important observations were made during the design
and development of the simulation:
1) All of the techniques under consideration are needed, and each,
when properly used, provides information required for error
recovery.
2) To say that the non-redundant information provided by a specific
technique is unnecessary requires detailed knowledge of the
system's behavior, which is not known in general.
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3) Trade-off metrics are difficult to measure and are often
misleading, making it difficult to draw conclusions from numeric
simulation results.
Experience with the simulation has shown that the error recovery
techniques are best used as a system. Modifying the usage of one
technique may have important consequences in the usage of another.
Therefore, the trade-off study that was initially desired is
inappropriate.
However, a simulation analysis is still very important. The most
important benefit is the capability to immediately evaluate the
performance of a recovery structure. The emphasis has shifted from a
quasi-quantitative trade-off analysis to a qualitative analysis. The
qualitative analysis allows system performance to be evaluated in terms
of specific failure events. It will be shown that with the exception of
these specific failure events, called "catastrophes", the system will
always recover.
The new objectives of the simulation analysis are to 1) provide
"real-time" experience with a transient error environment, 2) demonstrate
the methodology and evaluate its performance, 3) provide a tractable
framework for the problem through system modeling, and 4) to establish
suitable metrics for transient error recovery performance.
What to Simulate
It is important to realize that all outcomes of all possible upsets
cannot be accurately simulated. The objective of this simulation, or any
simulation, is to perform an analysis on models which are abstractions of
the real world that capture the essence, but not all the detail, of the
real world [7].
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The proposed transient error recovery methodology is capable of
detecting high-level errors. More precisely, if an error cannot be
detected by a high-level language, it cannot be corrected by the
methodology. An example of a high-level error is an upset to the
processor program counter. An upset to the processor program counter can
be detected by testing a sequence control code. Another example of a
high-level error is an upset to an internal ALU register. An ALU upset
can be detected by redundant computations. An example of a low-level
error is an upset to the system reset flip-flop. Such an upset destroys
the program state, and cannot be detected by a high-level language.
Consequently, if we simply assume that recovery will fail with all
low-level errors, then there is no motivation to do a detailed simulation
of the processor hardware and the specific flight code in order to
simulate the outcome of low-level errors.
The Multiple Bit Upset Model, the Upset Mapping Model, the High-
Level Language/Machine Language Model, and the Structure/Content Model,
strive to simplify the system to capture the essence of most high-level
errors. These models work together to simplify the system by abstracting
various aspects of the system. The Multiple Bit Upset Model is an
abstraction of the transient error environment, the Upset Mapping Model
is an abstraction of the system hardware, the High-Level Language/
Machine Language Model is an abstraction of the hardware/software
interface, and the Structure/Content Model is an abstraction of the
spacecraft software. The simulation program applies these models to a
specific "benchmark" computation block written in the recovery format.
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3.2 The System Models
3.2.1 The Multiple Bit Upset (MBU) Model
Definition: The Multiple Bit Upset Model abstracts transient errors
as events in which one or more bits per word may be upset
simultaneously.
The MBU Model is an abstraction of the transient error processes
which spacecraft experience. The MBU model is a generalization of the
known causes of transient errors: single event upsets, electro-static
discharges, and thermal noise. Intermittent hardware errors are not
modeled.
3.2.2 The Upset Mapping Model
Definition: The Upset Mapping Model abstracts the outcome of
multiple bit upsets as either main memory errors, processor memory
errors, or processor sequence errors. Any upset outcome not
modeled directly by the above outcomes can either be modeled
indirectly as a combination of the above errors, or must be
considered individually.
Definition: Main memory refers to the main bank of volatile RAM
memory.
Definition: Processor memory is the volatile memory used by the
processor, whether internal or external to the physical processor.
In the context of the simulation program, a "processor memory error"
refers to a processor memory error which can be observed by
inspecting the processor registers.
36
To determine the reasonableness of this model, it is first
necessary to enumerate the locations of volatile memory in spacecraft
hardware. Here is a list of volatile memory in a typical spacecraft
sub-system:
1) Main RAM memory
2) Addressable processor registers
3) Internal processor registers
4) The program counter
5) The stack pointer
6) The memory control hardware
- Hamming encoder/decoder, MMU, DMA
7) Misc. processor hardware
- interrupt enable register, etc.
8) Misc. sub-system hardware
- I/0 chips, clocks, control flip-flops, etc.
It is clear that upsets to the main memory and the program counter
are modeled well by main memory errors and processor sequence errors,
respectively. Upsets to the stack pointer, memory control hardware, and
miscellaneous processor and sub-system hardware are not modeled by the
upset mapping model, but are addressed in the probabilistic analysis.
These memory cells are not modeled because it is very difficult to
model the outcome of, say, an upset to a system clock flip-flop.
The outcome of an upset to an addressable processor register or an
internal processor register must be examined more closely. Some possible
outcomes from a processor register upset are:
1) an incorrect memory address is read.
2) an incorrect memory address is written to.
3) a correct memory address is read, but the data is incorrect.
4) a correct memory address is written to with incorrect data.
37
5) an incorrect program sequence is executed.
6) an incorrect program instruction is executed.
Reading the wrong main memory location and reading incorrect data
are both modeled by processor memory upsets. Writing to the wrong main
memory location and writing incorrect data to the correct address are
both modeled by main memory upsets. An incorrect program instruction
execution is not modeled by any of the above outcomes. An incorrect
program sequence execution is modeled directly by a sequence upset. It
will shown that an incorrect program instruction execution can be modeled
as a combination of sequence and memory errors.
To understand the effect of executing an incorrect program
instruction, it is necessary to categorize the various types of processor
instructions. Processor instructions can be divided into the following
categories: 1) data movement, 2) arithmetic operations, 3) program
control, and 4) status control. Any instruction transformation caused by
an upset can be modeled as a combination of sequence and memory errors.
The following transformations examples provide an illustration:
Example 1
MBU(data movement) -> incorrect data movement
e.g. MBU(mov rl,ADDR1) -> mov ADDR2,r6
= MBU(ADDRI) and MBU(r6)
- processor memory error and main memory error
Example 2
MBU(data movement) -> incorrect arithmetic operation
e.g. MBU(mov rl,r2) -> add rl,r2
= MBU(r2)
- processor memory error
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Example 3
MBU(data movement) -> incorrect program control
e.g. MBU(mov rl,r2) -> jmp label
= MBU(r2) and MBU(program counter)
- processor memory error and sequence error
Example 4
MBU(aritbmetic operation) -> incorrect data movement
e.g. MBU(add rl,r2) -> mov rl,r6
= MBU(r2) and MBU(r6)
- two processor memory errors
Example 5
MBU(arithmetic operation) -> incorrect arithmetic operation
e.g. MBU(add rl,r2) -> mul rl,r6
= MBU(r2) and MBU(r6)
- two processor memory errors
Example 6
MBU(arithmetic operation) -> incorrect sequence control
e.g. MBU(add rl,r2) -> jmp label
= MBU(r2) and MBU(program counter)
- processor memory error and sequence error
Example 7
MBU(sequence control) -> incorrect data movement
e.g. MBU(jmp label) -> mov rl,ADDR1
= MBU(ADDR1) and MBU(program counter)
- main memory error and sequence error
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Example 8
MBU(sequence control) -> incorrect arithmetic operation
e.g. MBU(jmp label) -> add rl,r2
= MBU(r2) and MBU(program counter)
- processor memory error and sequence error
Example 9
MBU(sequence control) -> incorrect sequence control
e.g. MBU(jmp labell) -> jmp label2
= MBU(program counter)
- sequence error
Example 10
MBU(status control) -> any other operation
= potential sequence error and result of incorrect operation
A distinction is made between processor memory errors and main
memory errors. The reason for making this distinction is that processor
memory errors can occur only to data currently being used in a
computation and the probability of a particular variable being upset is
independent how many copies are stored in main memory. For example,
critical variables, which are stored in triplicate, are three times more
likely of being upset in main memory that other variables. In processor
memory, critical variables are as likely of being upset as other
variables currently being processed.
3.2.3 The High-Level Language/Machine Language Model
Definition: The High-Level Language/Machine Language Model
abstracts errors from the Upset Mapping Model on bit level code
(machine language) and data as bit upsets on high-level language
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and data.
The Upset Mapping Model is based on the observation that all
results of the Upset Mapping Model can be produced using a high-level
language and that Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery is only
capable of recovering from errors that can be detected from a high-level.
Assuming the Upset Mapping Model is reasonable, then the High-Level
Language/Machine Language Model is a natural consequence.
The High-Level Language/Machine Language Model is an imperfect
abstraction. It suffers four problems 1) arbitrary machine-level
sequence errors are impossible, 2) machine code mis-interpretation is not
modeled, 3) upsets are atomic with respect to high-level language
statements, and 4) run-time checking prevents arbitrary data upsets.
A high-level language is simply not capable of jumping to any
equivalent individual machine language step. Using the GOTO statement
in high-level language allows one to jump to any line of high-level code.
The problem is that a line of high-level code may compile into possibly
several lines of machine language, making it impossible to make arbitrary
jumps on the machine instruction level
Machine code mis-interpretation is caused from the ambiguity of
stored programs, since machine language is context sensitive. For
example, the machine code 10110001 may be interpreted as the instruction
"inc Ri", or as the data B1 hex. Consequently, if a sequence error
occurs, the code intended to detect this error may be misinterpreted.
Clearly, this process cannot be modeled with a high-level language.
However, as noted in the appendix, this problem is easily solved with a
process called "NOP buffering".
A high-level language is not capable of injecting an upset in the
middle of a high-level statement. The real upset process is atomic with
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respect to machine instructions, that is, all upsets can be considered to
occur either before or after an machine instruction, but not during. The
modeled process is atomic with respect to high-level instructions. All
errors occur either before or after a high-level statement, but not
during.
High-level language run-time checking interferes with a high-level
languages' ability to model upsets to various control variables. For
example, an array subscript cannot be set to an arbitrary value without
causing a run-time error. The result of this constraint is that it
forces many unlikely recovery failures to become more likely, since many
control variables will always be upset to reasonable values in the
simulation.
The importance of these shortcomings is not clear. There is no
reason to believe any of these problems are serious. However, this model
is very important, for it, in conjunction with the Structure/Content Model
allow an abstract study of the upset process without having to consider
the implications of the specific flight software or the specific hardware
system.
3.2.4 The Structure/Content Model
Definition: The Structure/Content Model abstracts software as
having a recovery structure without computational content.
The Structure/Content Model embodies the idea that the ability of a
system to recover from transient errors does not depend upon what
computation is being performed, but on how it is being performed. It is
the structure of a computation, and not its content per se, which
dictates the performance of Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery.
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More specifically, the ability to perform error propagation control,
error detection, and error recovery upon the initialization, computation,
and action sections is independent of the specific action performed in
each section as long as the requirements, such as the idempotence and
atomic action requirements, are met.
A common exception to this model is a non-idempotent action section.
The fact that an action is non-idempotent does not give the recovery
routine the liberty to retry an action if an error is found. However,
any section which is idempotent, which includes all initialization and
computation sections, and most action sections, can be repeated if
necessary, so consequently, the specific content of the section is
irrelevant to recovery.
Although specific content of a section does not modify the ability
to recover, it does modify the outcome of upsets. Specifically, the
run-time characteristics of a program determine the result of a processor
memory upset. This fact is accounted for in the simulation by specifying
the run-time length of the program sections in the absence of errors.
The simulation upset rate is then modified in each section so that the
simulated run-time error density is equivalent to the specified run-time
error density.
The result of the Structure/Content Model is that any "benchmark"
block of code can be used in the simulation, rather than the actual
flight code. A good benchmark is one which allows a simple evaluation
of recovery. Specifically, the values of the critical variables should
be deterministic and conform to some pattern.
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3.3 Performance Metrics for Recovery Evaluation
It order to evaluate the effectiveness of Software Implemented
Transient Error Recovery, it is necessary to develop appropriate
performance measures for error recovery. This is not a simple task. I
propose the use of three metrics: coverage, recovery profile, and
probability of catastrophe. Since it is difficult to precisely define
the meaning of coverage and since recovery profile only applies to error
detection performance, I use the probability of catastrophe as the
principle metric of recovery.
First, some definitions:
Coverage:
Coverage is defined in reliability theory [8] as the conditional
probability that a failure of a unit will be detected and
appropriate recovery action will be performed given the occurrence
of a fault and sufficient resources for recovery. Since the
addressed phenomenon are transient in nature, no resources are
required for transient error recovery. For transient errors,
coverage is an aggregate measure of performance for error
propagation control, error detection, and error recovery.
Recovery Profile:
The recovery profile is a histogram of the number of detected
errors for each error detection technique. It is not capable of
measuring the effectiveness of error propagation control or error
recovery. The intention of the recovery profile is to determine
the relative value of error detection techniques.
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Catastrophes:
A catastrophe is an event which is the result of an upset, from
which a transient error recovery technique may not recover without
re-initialization and restart, if at all. In terms of ASM, a
catastrophic upset implies that autonomy may be compromised. In
terms of mission success, the result of a catastrophic upset is
undefined. The probability of catastrophe indicates recovery
performance in terms of the probability of events which a system
cannot recover. The probability of catastrophe is an aggregate
measure of performance for error propagation control, error
detection, and error recovery.
3.3.1 Coverage and Recovery Profile
Problems with Coverage
There are two problems with calculating coverage: single events
can result in multiple consequences, and the meaning of "appropriate
recovery action" is not well defined.
Multiplicity of effects - need for both coverage and recovery profile
One upset can result in several errors (error propagation), each of
which must be individually detected and corrected. Also, several errors
can be corrected by one action. Furthermore, some errors need no
correction at all.
It is difficult to decide what constitutes "appropriate recovery
action". There are two possible approaches to defining recovery. The
first is to consider recovery as an individual condition with respect to
upsets. That is, if an upset propagates into several errors, the system
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cannot be considered to have recovered unless all the errors caused by
that upset have been corrected. The problem with this approach is that
it is impossible to determine which error detection technique is
responsible for recovery, since many different techniques may share the
credit for detection.
The second approach to defining recovery is to consider recovery as
an individual condition with respect to errors. Whenever an error is
corrected, the system is said to recover. The problem with this approach
is that there may be more recoveries than upsets, so a ratio of
recoveries to upsets would be misleading as a metric of recovery. The
number of errors resulting from an upset is usually not known, so a ratio
of recoveries to errors cannot be computed.
The solution to this problem is to use both performance measures,
and give each a distinct meaning. The first performance measure is
called "coverage", which measures the effectiveness of recovery once
an upset has occurred. The second performance measure is called the
"recovery profile", which is a histogram of the error detection
techniques responsible for recovery. There is only a weak relationship
between the two measures. If error propagation occurs, then there is no
function which can determine the coverage from the recovery profile.
Meaning of Recovery
Another problem with defining "appropriate recovery action" is that
some errors do not have to be corrected at all. For example, if an upset
occurs to a memory register not in use, and this error is not corrected,
has the system failed to recover? Certainly not. A distinction must be
made between "critical" and "non-critical" variables. As defined in the
methodology chapter, critical variables are variables whose value has a
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direct effect upon some output of the system. Non-critical variables
have effect on the output of the system, but only through their effect
upon critical variables. If all relevant critical variables are correct
at the time of any output, then that output is correct, regardless of the
state of the non-critical variables.
Definition: For a system to "recover" from any number of upsets,
at least two out of three copies of the relevant (pertaining to the
current output) critical variables must have the correct value at
the time of any output action.
Definition: A "correct" value is the value that would be
determined by a computation in the absence of upsets (assuming time
invariant computations).
Meaning of Coverage
With a specific definition of recovery, it is possible to have a
specific definition of coverage. The definition should have the form:
(Number of recovered units) / (Total units executed)
The only thing left is to define the unit of execution. The two
possibilities are blocks and control loops. Either could be used.
As defined, it is difficult to understand coverage values in an
absolute sense. The value of coverage depends as much on the unit of
execution used and the number of critical variables as the recovery
technique used. Also, most software systems do not have critical
variables or computation blocks, so any definition of coverage may have
meaning to only a small subset of systems. Consequently, it is difficult
to precisely define coverage, or even understand its meaning in absolute
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terms for all systems.
3.3.2 Catastrophes
Problem with Probability of Catastrophe
The major problem with using the probability of catastrophe as a
figure of merit is that it is impossible to calculate when the number of
catastrophes is large. However, when the number of catastrophes is small,
it is an objective measure of recovery performance.
Although using the probability of catastrophe as a metric also
requires a precise definition of recovery (since catastrophes are defined
in terms of recovery), it does not have the numeric ambiguity that
coverage does. It should be pointed out that coverage and the
probability of catastrophe measure essentially the same thing; that is,
P(catastrophe I upset) = 1 - P(coverage I upset), except that coverage is
more difficult to define precisely. Since the number of catastrophes
detected by the simulation is small, the probability of catastrophe is
the best metric to measure recovery performance.
3.3.3 Time and Space
Additional execution time required for recovery and additional
memory required for recovery software are also important performance
metrics.
Additional execution time is used by error recovery for redundant
computations, redundant critical variable storage, and aborted
computations. It is clear that a real-time control program cannot spend
an arbitrary amount of time correcting errors, so the timeliness of
recovery is an important factor. The proposed methodology tries to
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minimize the additional execution time needed for recovery by reducing
the number of aborted computations through the "if in doubt, re-execute"
recovery strategy.
The additional memory requirement for more complicated flight
software is also important, but difficult to estimate for real flight
code.
3.4 Discussion of Results
Here is a list of the catastrophes detected by the simulation
program:
1) a critical control variable is upset, and the result
is reasonable
2) a sequence upset jumps to an SCC assignment
3) a sequence upset jumps to a non-idempotent action section
4) both SCC and reasonableness checks fail within the computation
or action sections.
5) two or three copies of a critical variable are upset
6) two incorrect calculations agree and are reasonable
7) both temporary copies of the calculation block are upset
to the same incorrect value
8) sequence control register is upset, and a sequence error
occurs.
Performance in Bursts of Upsets
The proposed recovery methodology is designed to recover from
bursts of upsets. The error recovery concept used is: "if in doubt,
re-execute". The advantages to this error recovery technique are :
1) the program will always make progress, or at least never lose ground,
in a burst of upsets, and 2) re-initialization is not required for
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recovery unless a catastrophe occurs.
The simulation program was run at a very high upset rate. With the
exception of the occurrence of catastrophes, the simulated system
recovered from bursts of upsets. With the error rate very high
(approximately one error per 10 lines of high-level code), catastrophe 4,
which requires restart, occurred often enough that the simulated control
loop could not terminate.
The simulation program does not simulate upsets during execution of
the recovery block. The problem of recovering during recovery, which is
a key factor for determining recovery performance during a burst of
upsets, is not addressed in this paper.
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PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
The objective of the probabilistic analysis is to evaluate the
performance of the proposed transient error recovery methodology in
comparison to alternative transient error methodologies in light of
future spacecraft autonomy requirements.
This performance analysis is accomplished by estimating the
conditional probability of catastrophe given an upset, and the mean time
to catastrophe (MTTC). The conditional probability of catastrophe given
an upset is used in lieu of the probability of catastrophe because the
probability of upset is determined by the hardware, and cannot be
modified by software techniques. It is the conditional probability of
catastrophe given an upset which Software Implemented Transient Error
Recovery has direct influence.
The first performance analysis performed is a detailed
probabilistic analysis based upon the simulation results. In this
analysis, the conditional probability of catastrophe given the occurrence
of an upset and the mean time to catastrophe are calculated with
parameters from the Intelsat VI ACE and with parameters from a possible
future spacecraft configuration, for both SEU and MBU cases.
The results of the first analysis suggests that an alternative form
of analysis gives reasonable results. This method approximates the
probability of catastrophe given an upset by simply determining which
flip-flops and registers in the sub-system are not covered by the
recovery methodology, and dividing by the total number of flip-flops in
the sub-system. Although the latter approach is certainly less accurate
than the former, it offers an advantage in that it can be applied to any
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system. In this analysis, the conditional probability of catastrophe
given the occurrence of an upset and the mean time to catastrophe are
calculated for four methodologies: a worst cases methodology, the
Intelsat VI ACE methodology, the proposed methodology, and the best case
methodology. Each case examines present and future spacecraft
sub-system configurations, for both SEU and MBU cases.
4.2 Detailed Probabilistic Analysis
The results of the simulation indicate that there is a small class
of upsets from which the system may not recover. This fact makes a
simple, but accurate probabilistic analysis of transient error recovery
possible. The class of upsets from which the system may not recover is
called catastrophes. In this analysis, the conditional probability of
catastrophe given the occurrence of an upset and the mean time to
catastrophe (MTTC) are calculated with parameters from the Intelsat VI
ACE and with parameters from a possible future spacecraft configuration,
for both SEU and MBU cases.
4.2.1 Definitions
Before preceeding with the probabilistic analysis, a few terms
require definition or clarification:
Modified Definition of MBU:
The previous (correct) definition of a multiple bit upset was an
event in which one or more bits per word may be upset
simultaneously. Since the probabilistic analysis is simplified
by looking at two cases, the single bit upset case and the multiple
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( > 1) bit upset case, it will be assumed that the term MBU does
not refer to the single bit case within this section.
Definition of Critical Registers:
Critical registers are registers within the processor and its
supporting logic which can result in a catastrophe if upset, and
are not covered by Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery.
Since they are referred to as "registers" (as opposed to
"flip-flops"), the implication is that they typically hold value
information as opposed to control information, their criticalness
has a low duty-cycle. Thus, an upset during a non-critical period,
such as the execution of a wait loop, is not catastrophic.
Definition of Critical Flip-Flops:
Critical flip-flops are flip-flops within the processor and its
supporting logic which can result in a catastrophe if upset, and
are not covered by Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery.
Since they are referred to as "flip-flops" (as opposed to
"registers"), the implication is that they typically hold control
information as opposed to value information, their criticalness has
a high duty-cycle. Thus, most upsets to critical flip-flops are
catastrophic.
Definition of SEU Upset Rate:
The SEU upset rate refers to the frequency of upsets caused by
cosmic radiation, based upon tests conducted upon actual devices
[3,12]. The upsets are assumed to occur in a constant stream,
which accurately models the real phenomenon. The rate used is
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0.0001 upsets/(bit-day).
Definition of MBU Upset Rate:
The MBU upset rate refers to the frequency of upsets caused
primarily by the electrostatic discharge problem. There is no
accurate data available on the frequency characteristics of
electrostatic discharges. Since it is known that SEUs are the
dominant source of transient error in present spacecraft systems,
the MBU rate was chosen so that the frequency of catastrophic
upsets caused by MBUs is the same order of magnitude as the
frequency of catastrophic upsets caused by SEUs. The rate used
is 0.000001 upsets/(bit-day).
4.2.2 Failure Classifications
Definition of Catastrophe:
An event which is the result of an upset, which a transient error
recovery technique may not recover without re-initialization and
restart, if at all. In terms of ASM, a catastrophic upset
implies that autonomy may be compromised. In terms of mission
success, the result of a catastrophic upset is undefined.
Catastrophes are divided into two categories, first-order
catastrophes, which result from one upset, and second-order catastrophes,
which result from two upsets. The list of first-order catastrophes is
intended to be comprehensive. The list of second-order catastrophes may
not be comprehensive. However, it will be shown that the probability of
occurrence of a second-order catastrophe is small compared to the
probability of occurrence of first-order catastrophes so they can be
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ignored.
Catastrophes:
First-Order Catastrophes:
First-Order Catastrophes are events that are either not
covered by any of the recovery techniques, or events that
bypass the recovery techniques.
1) a critical processor register is upset
( from Upset Mapping Model )
2) a critical processor control flip-flop is upset
( from Upset Mapping Model )
3) a critical control variable is upset, and the result
is reasonable
( bypasses reasonableness checking )
4) a sequence upset jumps to an SCC assignment
( bypasses SCC checking )
5) a sequence upset jumps to a non-idempotent action section
( from Structure/Content Model )
Second-Order Catastrophes:
All error recovery techniques work by comparing redundant
information. Second-order catastrophes are events which
destroy enough redundant information to require restart or
result in incorrect recovery decisions. It is impossible to
insure that there is enough redundant information for correct
recovery; consequently, it is impossible to eliminate second-
order catastrophes. However, it is possible to make the
probability of second-order catastrophes arbitrarily small by
increasing the amount of redundant information. This might
be a good strategy if one is concerned about bursts of upsets.
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6) both SCC and reasonableness checks fail within computation
or action sections.
(requires restart)
7) two or three copies of a critical variable are upset
(incorrect recovery)
8) two incorrect calculations agree and are reasonable
(incorrect recovery)
9) both temporary copies of the calculation block are upset
to the same incorrect value
(incorrect recovery)
10) sequence control register is upset, and a sequence error
occurs.
(incorrect recovery)
4.2.3 General Detailed Probabilistic Analysis
System Constants
1) frequency of upsets to system
(in SEUs/(bit-day))
2) frequency of upsets to system
(in MBUs/(bit-day))
3) probability of main memory upset
given an upset to system
4) probability of processor memory upset
given an upset to system
5) probability of processor sequence upset
given an upset to system
6) size of main memory (in bytes)
7) size of processor memory (in bits)
8) action section size (in instructions)
9) time in the wait loop
10) word size (in bits)
11) address space (in bytes)
12) number of blocks
13) number of sections
: SEUFREQ
: MBUFREQ
: MS
: PS
: PSS
:= MMS
:= PMS
: COM
:= WL
:= WS
: AS
= NOB
NOS
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14) number of critical processor registers
15) number of critical control variables
( not including SCC )
16) number of reasonable values
for control variables
17) number of critical processor control
flip-flops (in bits)
18) number of control loops executed
per second
: NOCPR
: NOCV
= NORV
: NOFF
: CLFREQ
Given that an upset has occurred...
First-Order Catastrophes:
1) the probability a critical processor register is upset
= (WS)(NOCPR)(PS)/(PMS)
PS is the probability that any bit in the processor is upset,
given an upset has occurred. Dividing PS by the number of
processor bits PMS, gives the probability any specific bit is
upset. This number is then multiplied by the number of critical
processor register bits (WS)(NOCPR).
2) the probability a critical processor control flip-flop is upset
= (NOFF)(PS)/(PMS)
Same as 1, except NOFF is in terms of flip-flops, consequently
it does not need to be scaled by WS.
3) the probability a control variable is upset, and its results are
reasonable
57
= (MS/MMS + PS/PMS)(NOS)(NOB)/(2**WS)
+ (MS/MMS + PS/PMS)(NOCV)(NORV)/(2**WS)
The first term is the probability that a sequence control
register is upset to a reasonable value, which is equal to the
probability a sequence control register is upset in main memory
(MS/MMS) or a sequence control register is upset in the
processor memory (PS/PMS) multiplied by the number of reasonable
values (NOS*NOB) divided by the total number of values possible
(2**WS).
The second factor is the same as the first, except it is scaled
by the number of critical variables other than the SCC, and the
number of reasonable values NORV, which is the average number of
reasonable values for all the critical variables.
4) the probability a sequence upset jumps to an SCC assignment
= (PSS)(NOS)(NOB)/(AS)
PSS is the probability a sequence upset occurs, given an upset
has occurred. Multiplying PSS by the number of sequence
assignments (NOS)(NOB) and dividing by the total number of
possible addresses gives the probability a sequence upset jumps
to an SCC assignment.
5) the probability a sequence upset jumps to a non-idempotent
action section
= (PSS)(NOB)(COM)/(AS)
PSS is the probability a sequence upset occurs, given an upset
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has occurred. Multiplying PSS by the number of action
statements (NOB)(COM) and dividing by the total number of
possible addresses gives the probability a sequence upset jumps
to a action section. This value is an upper bound, since an
erroneous execution of an action section is only a catastrophe
if the section is not idempotent.
Further explanation of calculations 4 and 5:
In calculations 4 and 5, the probability of a sequence catastrophe
is given as the number of bad addresses divided by the address
space. This calculation assumes that the probability of jumping
from any random address to a given bad address is equally likely
for all addresses independent of N, the number of bits flipped by
the upset. I wish to show that for random bad addresses and large
address spaces, the calculation is independent of N.
let
WS word size
AS = address space
N = upper bound of number of bits flipped
M = number of bad addresses
f(N,M) = number of original addresses which can permute to a
bad address
g(N) = number of N bit permutations
Suppose the word size WS = 8, AS = 256, and N = 4 and I am given
a bad address. The first question is how many original addresses
can map to the bad address with N or less bit flips ? Since this
calculation is like a Bernoulli process,
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= 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
number of addresses
mapped by N bit flips = 1
number of addresses
mapped by N or less
bit flips = f(N,M=1) = 1
8 28 56 70 56 28 8 1
9 37 93 163 219 247 255 256
So the probability of being on an address which can map to a bad
address with N = 4 bit flips is f(N,M=1)/AS, or in this case,
163/256. The next question is, given an address which can be
mapped to a bad address, what is the probability that it will be
mapped to a bad address? This calculation is the same Bernoulli
process as above, so this probability is 1/g(N) = 1/f(N,M=1).
For one bad address, the probability of jumping to that bad address
is
Prob of jumping to a bad address
= (f(NM14) / AS) * (1 / g(N)) = 1/AS
For many bad addresses, the upper bound for f(N,M>l) is M*f(N, M1-l).
However, several bad addresses can have the same original address,
so f(N,M) <= M*f(N,M=1) and of course, f(N,M) <= AS. But for large
AS, the probability of overlap is small. Furthermore, if the bad
addresses are random, the overlap of original address should be
negligible. Consequently,
Prob of jumping to a bad address (M)
= N/AS , where M << AS
which is independent of N.
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4.2.4 Intelsat VI ACE Example
In this analysis, the conditional probability of catastrophe given
the occurrence of an upset and the mean time to catastrophe are
calculated with parameters from the Intelsat VI ACE for both the SEU and
MBU cases. The system constants were taken from Obert [15].
Example 1 - Intelsat VI ACE with Software
Recovery
System Constants
Implemented Transient Error
1) frequency of upsets to system
(in SEUs/(bit-day)) 0.0001
2) frequency of upsets to system
(in MBUs/(bit-day)) 0.000001
3) probability of main memory upset
given an upset to system 0.96
4) probability of processor memory upset
given an upset to system 0.035
5) probability of processor sequence upset
given an upset to system 0.005
6) size of main memory (in bits) 13 K
7) size of processor memory (in bits) 539
8) action section size (in instructions) 5
9) time in the wait loop 0.80
10) word size (in bits) 8
11) address space (in bytes) 2**16
12) number of blocks 10
13) number of sections 3
14) number of critical processor registers 3
15) number of critical control variables 3
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16) number of reasonable values
for control variables 10
17) number of critical processor control
flip-flops (in bits) 30
18) number of control loops executed
per second : 42
Given that an upset has occurred...
First-Order Catastrophes:
1) the probability a critical processor register is upset
= (WS)(NOCPR)(PS)/(PMS) = (8)(3)(0.035)/(539) = 0.00156
2) the probability a critical processor control flip-flop is upset
= (NOFF)(PS)/(PMS) = (30)(0.035)/(539) = 0.00195
3) the probability a control variable is upset, and the results are
reasonable
= (MS/MMS + PS/PMS)(NOS)(NOB)/(2**WS)
+ (MS/MMS + PS/PMS)(NOCV)(NORV)/(2**WS)
= (0.96/13*2**10 + 0.035/539)(3)(10)/(2**8)
+ (0.96/13*2**10 + 0.035/539)(3)(10)/(2**8)
= (0.000137)(60)/(2**8) = 0.0000321
4) the probability a sequence upset jumps to an SCC assignment
= (PSS)(NOS)(NOB)/(AS)
= (0.005)(3)(10)/(2**16)
= 0.00000229
5) the probability a sequence upset jumps to a non-idempotent
action section
= (PSS)(NOB)(COM)/(AS)
= (0.005)(10)(5)/(2**16)
= 0.00000381
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Second-Order Catastrophes:
Since second-order catastrophes require two upsets to occur during
the execution of one control loop, it is first necessary to
calculate the probability of two upsets within one loop, given that
one upset has already occurred.
Active time during one control loop
= Tl = (1 - WL) / CLFREQ = (1 - 0.80) / 42
= 0.00476 sec
Memory size
= MMS + PMS = 13*2**10 + 539 = 13851 bits
Frequency of upsets
= le-4 SEUs/(bit-day) * 13851 bits * 1 day / 86400 sec
= 0.0000160 SEUs/sec
Mean time between upsets (MTBU) = 1/0.0000160 = 62378 sec
Probability that another upset occurs within Tl
= TI / MTBU = 0.00476 / 62378 = 0.0000000763
Since the probability of two upsets occurring during one control
loop is several orders of magnitude less than the probability of a
first-order catastrophe occurring, it is safe to ignore higher
order catastrophes.
TOTAL PROBABILITY OF CATASTROPHE given an upset has occurred
= 0.00156 + 0.00195 + 0.0000321 + 0.00000229
+ 0.00000381
= 0.00354
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MEAN TIME TO CATASTROPHE
For MBUs,
P probability of catastrophe given an upset
= 0.00354
MTTC = mean time to catastrophe
= 1 / (MBUFREQ * PMS*P )
1 / ( le-6 MBUs/(bit-day) * (13 K + 539) bits *
0.00354 catastrophe/upset )
= 20400 days
For SEUs, all registers, except critical control flip-flops, are
vulnerable only during active processing time. Any other single
event upsets that occur during the execution of the wait loop are
covered.
For SEUs, the TOTAL PROBABILITY OF CATASTROPHE given an upset has
occurred
= 0.00195 + (1 - 0.80)( 0.00156 + 0.0000321
+ 0.00000229 + 0.00000381 )
= 0.00226
MEAN TIME TO CATASTROPHE
For SEUs,
P = probability of catastrophe given an upset
= 0.00226
MTTC = mean time to catastrophe
= 1 / ( SEUFREQ * PMS*P )
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= 1 / ( le-4 SEUs/(bit-day) * (13 K + 539) bits *
0.00226 catastrophe/upset )
= 318 days
4.2.5 Future Spacecraft Example
In this analysis, the conditional probability of catastrophe given
the occurrence of an upset and the mean time to catastrophe are
calculated with parameters from a hypothetical future spacecraft for both
the SEU and MBU cases.
The system constants used in the future spacecraft example are
intended to give a conservative lower bound in the performance of
Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery. The hypothetical system
has a 16 bit data word and 60 K bits main memory. The processor and
software systems have about four times the complexity of their Intelsat
VI counterparts. The upset rates are assumed to be the same as the
Intelsat VI ACE upset rates.
Example 2 - Hypothetical future spacecraft with Software Implemented
Transient Error Recovery
System Constants
1) frequency of upsets to system
(in SEUs/(bit-day)) 0.0001
2) frequency of upsets to system
(in MBUs/(bit-day)) 0.000001
3) probability of main memory upset
given an upset to system 0.960
4) probability of processor memory upset
given an upset to system 0.035
5) probability of processor sequence upset
given an upset to system 0.005
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6) size of main memory (in bits) 60 K
7) size of processor memory (in bits) 2 K
8) action section size (in instructions) 10
9) time in the wait loop : 0.50
10) word size (in bits) 16
11) address space (in bytes) 2**32
12) number of blocks 20
13) number of sections 3
14) number of critical processor registers 10
15) number of critical control variables : 10
16) number of reasonable values
for control variables 100
17) number of critical processor control
flip-flops (in bits) : 100
18) number of control loops executed
per second : 50
Given that an upset has occurred...
First-Order Catastrophes:
1) the probability a critical processor register is upset
= (WS)(NOCPR)(PS)/(PMS) = (16)(10)(0.035)/(2*2**10)
= 0.00273
2) the probability a critical processor control flip-flop is upset
= (NOFF)(PS)/(PMS) = (100)(0.035)/(2*2**10)
= 0.00170
3) the probability a control variable is upset, and the results are
reasonable
= (MS/MMS + PS/PMS)(NOS)(NOB)/(2**WS)
+ (MS/MMS + PS/PMS)(NOCV)(NORV)/(2**WS)
66
= (0.996160*2**10 + 0.035/2*2**10)(3)(20)/(2**16)
+ (0.996/60*2**10 + 0.035/2*2**10)(10)(l00)/(2**16)
= (0.0000333)(1060)/(2**16) = 0.000000539
4) the probability a sequence upset jumps to an SCC assignment
= (PSS)(NOS)(NOB)/(AS)
= (0.005)(3)(20)/(2**32)
= 6.98 e -11
5) the probability a sequence upset jumps to a non-idempotent
action section
= (PSS)(NOB)(COM)/(AS)
= (0.005)(20)(10)/(2**32)
= 2.32 e -10
Second-Order Catastrophes:
Again, since second-order catastrophes require two upsets to occur
during the execution of one control loop, it is first necessary to
calculate the probability of two upsets within one loop, given that
one upset has occurred.
Active time during one control loop
= TI = (1 - WL) / CLFREQ = (1 - 0.50) / 50 0.01 sec
Memory size
= MMS + PMS = 60 * 2 ** 10 + 2* 2 ** 10= 63488 bits
Frequency of upsets
= le-4 SEUs/(bit-day) * 63488 bits * 1 day / 86400 sec
= 0.0000735 SEUs/sec
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Mean time between upsets (MTBU) = 1/0.0000735 = 13608 sec
Probability that another upset occurs in TI
= T1 / MTBU = 0.01 / 13608 = 0.000000735
Since the probability of two upsets occurring during one control
loop is several orders of magnitude less than the probability of a
first-order catastrophe occurring, it is safe to ignore higher
order catastrophes.
TOTAL PROBABILITY OF CATASTROPHE given an upset has occurred
= 0.00273 + 0.00170 + 0.000000539 + 6.98 e -11
+ 2.32 e -10
= 0.00444
MEAN TIME TO CATASTROPHE
For MBUs,
P = probability of catastrophe given an upset
= 0.00444
MTTC = mean time to catastrophe
= 1/ (MBUFREQ * PMS*P )
1 / ( le-6 MBUs/(bit-day) * (60 K + 2 K) bits *
0.00444 catastrophe/upset )
= 3540 days
For SEUs, all registers, except processor control flip-flops,
are vulnerable only during active processing time. Any other
single event upsets that occur during the execution of the wait
loop are covered.
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For N = 1, TOTAL PROBABILITY OF CATASTROPHE given an upset has
occurred
= 0.00170 + (1 - 0.50) (0.00273 + 0.000000539
+ 6.98 e -11 + 2.32 e -10 )
= 0.00307
MEAN TIME TO CATASTROPHE
For SEUs,
P = probability of catastrophe given an upset
= 0.00307
MTTC = mean time to catastrophe
= 1/( SEUFREQ * PMS * P )
1 / ( le-4 SEUs/(bit-day) * (60 K + 2 K) bits *
0.00307 catastrophe/upset )
= 51.2 days
4.3 Register Method
The results of the detailed probabilistic analysis suggests that an
alternative form of analysis can give reasonable results. Since the
probability of a catastrophic upset in a register which is not covered by
the methodology is far greater than a catastrophic upset to a register
which is covered, a close approximation to the probability of catastrophe
given an upset is the ratio of the number uncovered registers to the
total number of registers. Although this new approach using coverage is
certainly less accurate than the original, it offers an advantage in that
it can be applied to any system using any recovery methodology. In this
analysis, the conditional probability of catastrophe given the occurrence
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of an upset and the mean time to catastrophe are calculated for four
methodologies: a worst cases methodology, the Intelsat VI ACE methodology,
the proposed methodology, and the best case methodology. Each case
examines present and future spacecraft sub-system configurations, for
both SEU and MBU cases.
As noted in section 3.3, there are problems associated with using
coverage as a performance metric, specifically, coverage is difficult to
define precisely. However, since this technique is used to give a rough
approximation, the difficulty in making a precise definition of coverage
are not important.
Note on accuracy:
It should be noted that it is very difficult to estimate various
key parameters for this analysis, such as the number of critical
flip-flops, and the number of critical registers, as well as the upset
rates. Since the result of any calculation can be no more accurate than
the numbers it uses, more accurate calculations (than presented in this
section) are of little use without more accurate parameters. However,
since the objective of the calculations is to make relative comparisons
between different recovery configurations, rather large errors can be
tolerated.
4.3.1 Register Method Procedure
The procedure to determine the conditional probability of
catastrophe given an upset using the register method is quite simple.
For a given sub-system and a given recovery methodology, there are four
cases : SEU computation case, SEU wait loop case, MBU computation case,
and MBU wait loop case. For each case, one must categorize all the
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flip-flops in the sub-system as either covered by a methodology, or not
covered by a methodology. As a rule, a flip-flop should be covered at
least 80% of the time to be considered covered by a methodology. For
each case, the probability of catastrophe given an upset is the ratio of
the number of uncovered flip-flops to total number of flip-flops. Then
the computation case and wait loop case are combined as a weighted sum.
Four flip-flop categories are used : main memory, internal memory,
critical registers, and critical flip-flops. Main memory is the volatile
RAM, including any RAM used for error correcting purposes. The critical
registers are registers within the processor and its supporting logic
which can result in a catastrophe if upset, and are not covered by
Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery. Since they are referred
to as "registers" (as opposed to "flip-flops"), the implication is that
they typically hold value information as opposed to control information.
Critical flip-flops are flip-flops within the processor and its
supporting logic which can result in a catastrophe if upset, and are not
covered by Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery. Since they are
referred to as "flip-flops" (as opposed to "registers"), the implication
is that they typically hold control information as opposed to value
information. Critical flip-flops cannot be covered by any software
implemented recovery technique. Internal Memory is the remaining
memory in the processor and its supporting logic that is not considered
critical.
The flip-flops for the Intelsat VI ACE configuration and the future
spacecraft configuration break down as follows:
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Intelsat VI ACE Memory Parameters
Main Memory Size 13312 bits
Internal Memory Size 485 bits
Critical Register Size 24 bits
Critical Flip-Flop Size 30 bits
Table 1
Future Spacecraft Sub-system Memory Parameters
Main Memory Size 61440 bits
Internal Memory Size 1788 bits
Critical Register Size 160 bits
Critical Flip-Flop Size 100 bits
Table 2
This break down is in agreement with the values previously used in the
detailed probabilistic analysis.
The above procedure is applied to the data contained in tables
1 through 6, and is summarized in section 4.4.
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4.3.2 The Worst Case Methodology
Definition :
The worst case methodology provides the minimum coverage. It
uses error-correcting codes to recover from SEUs in main memory.
General Spacecraft Sub-System
Worst Case Methodology Coverage
SEU Case
Main Memory
Internal Registers
Critical Registers
Critical Flip-Flops
MBU Case
Main Memory
Internal Registers
Critical Registers
Critical Flip-Flops
Computation
C
NC
NC
NC
Computation
NC
NC
NC
NC
Wait Loop
C
NC
NC
NC
Wait Loop
NC
NC
NC
NC
C : Covered by Methodology
NC : Not Covered by Methodology
Table 3
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4.3.3 The Intelsat VI ACE Methodology
Definition :
The Intelsat VI ACE methodology is the approach proposed by
Obert. It protects the main memory from SEUs, and the internal and
critical registers from SEUs while in the wait loop. It provides
very little coverage of internal and critical registers during
computation. It offers very little coverage against MBUs.
General Spacecraft Sub-System
Intelsat VI ACE Methodology Coverage
SEU Case
Main Memory
Internal Registers
Critical Registers
Critical Flip-Flops
Computation
C
NC
NC
NC
MBU Case Computa
Main Memory NC
Internal Registers NC
Critical Registers NC
Critical Flip-Flops NC
C : Covered by Methodology
NC : Not Covered by Methodology
Table 4
Wait Loop
C
C
C
NC
Wait Loop
NC
NC
NC
NC
tion
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4.3.4 The Proposed Methodology
Definition :
The proposed methodology covers all of the processor and control
memory except for the critical registers and flip-flops. Critical
registers are covered during the wait loop for SEUs.
General Spacecraft Sub-System
Proposed Methodology Coverage
SEU Case
Main Memory
Internal Registers
Critical Registers
Critical Flip-Flops
Computation
C
C
NC
NC
MBU Case Computation
Main Memory C
Internal Registers C
Critical Registers NC
Critical Flip-Flops NC
C Covered by Methodology
NC Not Covered by Methodology
Table 5
Wait Loop
C
C
C
NC
Wait Loop
C
C
NC
NC
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4.3.5 The Best Case Methodology
Definition :
The best case methodology provides the maximum protection
against SEUs and MBUs possible using software techniques alone.
Only upsets to the critical flip-flips can result in catastrophe.
General Spacecraft Sub-System
Best Case Methodology Coverage
SEU Case
Main Memory
Internal Registers
Critical Registers
Critical Flip-Flops
MBU Case
Main Memory
Internal Registers
Critical Registers
Critical Flip-Flops
Computation
C
C
C
NC
Computation
C
C
C
NC
C : Covered by Methodology
NC : Not Covered by Methodology
Table 6
Wait Loop
C
C
C
NC
Wait Loop
C
C
C
NC
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4.4 Summary of Results
PROBABILITY OF CATASTROPHE GIVEN AN UPSET
Intelsat VI ACE Configuration
SEU
Worst Case 0.0389
ACE Methodology 0.00952
Proposed Methodology 0.00251
Proposed Methodology 0.00226
(from detailed analysis)
Best Case 0.00217
MBU (N > 1)
1.0
1.0
0.00390
0.00355
0.00217
Table 7
Future Spacecraft Configuration
SEU
Worst Case 0.0323
ACE Methodology 0.0169
Proposed Methodology 0.00284
Proposed Methodology 0.00307
(from detailed analysis)
Best Case 0.00158
MBU (N > 1)
1.00
1.00
0.00410
0.00444
0.00158
Table 8
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MEAN TIME TO CATASTROPHE
( in days)
Intelsat VI ACE Configuration
SEU
Worst Case 18.6
ACE Methodology 75.9
Proposed Methodology 287.
Proposed Methodology 318.
(from detailed analysis)
Best Case 333.
MBU (N > 1)
72.2
72.2
18500.
20400.
33300.
Table 9
Future Spacecraft Configuration
SEU
Worst Case 4.88
ACE Methodology 9.31
Proposed Methodology 55.6
Proposed Methodology 51.2
(from detailed analysis)
Best Case 100.
Table 10
MBU (N > 1)
15.8
15.8
3850.
3540.
10000.
4.5 Discussion of Results
As indicated in the introduction, the primary motivation for
examining the transient error recovery problem is future autonomous
spacecraft maintenance (ASM) requirements. Although transient error
recovery has some impact upon other system requirements such as
reliability, the principle consideration is autonomy. Although
catastrophic upsets can result in spacecraft failure, the most likely
outcome is loss of autonomy.
Autonomy is defined as the attribute of a spacecraft system that
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allows it to operate without external control, and to perform its
specified mission at an established performance level for a specified
period of time. Typically, the period specified in autonomy requirements
is one month.
By examining figures 1 - 4, it is clear that the transient error
recovery methodology proposed for the Intelsat VI ACE is sufficient for
that system, with a MTTC for SEUs of over 2 months. However, if the same
transient error recovery methodology is applied to the future spacecraft
configuration, the results are unacceptable, with a MTTC of only 6 days
for SEUs. The proposed transient error recovery has much better
performance, with a MTTC of over 2 months for SEUs, which should be
acceptable. Although MBUs are not a problem with the Intelsat VI ACE
configuration, they become an important factor with the future spacecraft
configuration, since the Intelsat VI ACE methodology provides almost no
protection from MBUs.
For the present spacecraft configuration, the proposed methodology
offers approximately a factor of 4 improvement over the Intelsat VI ACE
methodology, and a factor of 16 improvement over the worst case. For the
future spacecraft configuration, the proposed methodology offers
approximately a factor of 10 improvement over the Intelsat VI ACE
methodology, and a factor of 12 improvement over the worst case.
The most important observation to be made is that several orders of
magnitude improvement over the worst case methodology is simply not
possible using software techniques alone. The limiting factor is the
inability to recover from upsets to critical control flip-flops using
software techniques. To make a major break-though in transient error
recovery, both hardware and software redundancy techniques must be used.
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CONCLUSION
As stated in the introduction, the proposed methodology for
Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery has the following
advantages over previous efforts: 1) it offers a structured, standardized
approach to transient error recovery, 2) it has safeguards to limit error
propagation, 3) it is effective on multiple event upsets, and 4) it does
not require re-initialization to recover from upsets in most cases.
The transient error recovery methodology used by on Intelsat VI ACE
has its merits. Specifically, it is relatively simple to implement and
it is very effective in recovering from single event upsets. With
present spacecraft requirements and configurations, this approach is
probably the method of choice, since single event upsets are the
predominant source of transient errors and since the present control
systems are greatly oversampled, giving natural immunity to transient
errors. However, future spacecraft systems and requirements may not have
the tolerance that present systems have. As shown in the probabilistic
analysis, it seems unlikely that the future spacecraft configuration
using the recovery methodology used on the Intelsat VI ACE could achieve
a one month autonomy requirement. It was also shown that the proposed
transient error recovery methodology could make a one month autonomy
requirement.
An important conclusion which must be drawn is that if extremely
lengthy autonomy periods are required, or very complex control systems
are used, then software implemented techniques are not sufficient. Such
systems would have to integrate both hardware and software recovery
techniques. The proposed Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery
methodology is compatible with most hardware oriented fault-tolerant
techniques, and could be used with them.
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APPENDIX
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRANSIENT ERROR RECOVERY
This is a summary of additional programming rules, many of which
are unrelated to the methodology, but are important to. minimizing the
effects of transient errors.
1) No FOR statements:
A FOR statement which is improperly entered by a sequence upset
will never terminate. A simple solution is to use a WHILE
statement, which will always terminate.
2) Reasonableness checking of loop variables during WHILE loops:
Although WHILE loops will always terminate in the presence of
upsets, it may take a very long time. For example, a WHILE loop
which iterates from one to four, if upset to -10000, will
eventually terminate, but could take a very long time to do so.
3) Computation loop should have an upper bound on the number of
iterations:
If for some reason the computation block never obtains two
equal results, the computation section will never terminate.
The computation section should call a recovery block after the
execution of some maximum number of iterations.
4) Carefully choose sequence control codes:
There are two considerations in choosing sequence control codes:
a) The larger the Hamming distance between codes, the more
effective the error recovery. The error recovery routine checks
sequence control codes for reasonableness. Large Hamming
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distances between codes will prevent upset codes from appearing
correct.
b) The simpler the codes, the easier it is to check the code for
reasonableness in the recovery block. Use codes which conform
to some pattern which is easy to check.
5) Use specific constants instead of variables when possible:
Variables which influence the permanent program state that are
upset eventually have to be corrected. Constants, which are
stored in program ROM, do not have to be corrected if upset
since their values are re-read during program execution.
6) Clear stack on RTI entry:
Protects against stack pointer upsets.
7) Periodically re-enable interrupts:
To protect against spurious disable interrupt instructions,
re-enable interrupt instructions should be placed throughout
the code.
8) Run-time considerations in calculation of reasonableness checks:
The results of time varying computations cannot be directly
compared, since the correct results change with time. The
difference between time variant computations would have to be
compared to some predetermined margin.
9) Give priority to the most important routines:
Since the first blocks in a control program have a higher
probability of completion than the last blocks, the most
important functions, such as the despin function on the Intelsat
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VI ACE, should be executed first.
10) Something should be done in hardware to call a error recovery
routine when the processor attempts to address memory outside
the physical address space.
11) Protect against machine code mis-interpretation with NOPs:
Machine code mis-interpretation is caused by the ambiguity of
stored programs, since machine language is context sensitive.
For example, the machine code 10110001 may be interpreted as the
instruction "inc Ri", or as the data BI hex. Consequently, if a
sequence error occurs, the code intended to detect this error
may be misinterpreted. This problem is solved with a process
called "NOP buffering".
Example:
instead of compiling
x := x + 1;
if scc <> 5 then
goto errorrecovery;
as
mov RO, x
inc RO
mov x, RO
mov RO, scc
mov Ri, 5
cmp
jne errorrecovery
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use
mov RO, x
inc RO
mov x, RO
nop
nop
mov RO, scc
mov RI, 5
cmp
jne errorrecovery
To see why NOP buffering is a good idea, we have to examine the
machine code. To do this, I will use a hypothetical instruction
set.
With NOPs:
1 -> 1: 10101000 mov RO, x
2: 11110010
2 -> 3: 00010010
4: 11001000 inc RO
5: 10100000 mov x, RO
3 -> 6: 11110010
7: 00010010
8: 00000000 nop
4 -> 9: 00000000 nop
10: 10101000 mov RO, scc
11: 11000101
12: 00101010
13: 10001001 mov RI, 5
14: 00000101
15: 11010101 cmp
16: 10101101 jne errorrecovery
17: 01010100
18: 01001001
Assume a sequence error has occurred. The program counter may
be set to any location in the address space. Lets examine how
the machine code is interpreted in the above cases.
Case 1:
Sequence error coincides with the beginning of an instruction.
The machine code is interpreted correctly.
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Case 2:
Sequence error does not coincide with the beginning of an
instruction. In the worst case, the machine code could be
interpreted as:
3: 00010010 add R2, ADDR1
4: 11001000
5: 10100000
6: 11110010 rot R2
7: 00010010 mul R2, ADDR2
8: 00000000
9: 00000000
10: 10101000 mov RO, scc
11: 11000101
12: 00101010
etc..
Lines 3 through 9 are mis-interpreted, so they executed
incorrectly. However, correct execution begins on line 10,
so the sequence error is detected by testing the sequence
control code. Had there not been NOPs, the instructions may
have been interpreted as:
3: 00010010 add R2, ADDR1
4: 11001000
5: 10100000
6: 11110010 rot R2
7: 00010010 mul R2, ADDR2
10: 10101000
11: 11000101
12: 00101010 dec R2
etc..
Without the NOPs, the code intended to detect sequence errors
is completely ineffective, since it is not correctly executed.
Case 3:
Sequence error does not coincide with the beginning of an
instruction. Same outcome as case 2.
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Case 4:
Sequence error coincides with the beginning of an instruction.
Machine code is interpreted correctly.
As shown in this example, a sequence error which causes machine
code mis-interpretation can make error recovery ineffective.
Inserting extra NOPs before recovery code can correct this
problem.
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THE SIMULATION PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
The objectives of the simulation program are to provide real-time
experience with a transient error environment, to demonstrate the
methodology, and to evaluate its performance. The Multiple Bit Upset
Model, the Upset Mapping Model, the High-Level Language/Machine Language
Model, and the Structure/Content Model strive to simplify the system
to capture the essence of most high-level errors. These models work
together to simplify the system by abstracting various aspects of the
system. The Multiple Bit Upset Model is an abstraction of the transient
error environment, the Upset Mapping Model is an abstraction of the
system hardware, the High-Level Language/Machine Language Model is an
abstraction of the hardware/software interface, and the Structure/Content
Model is an abstraction of the spacecraft software. The simulation
program applies these models to a specific "benchmark" computation block
written in the recovery format.
The computation block used in the program is a very simple routine
which performs a simple transformation on critical variables. The
routine takes the average of four critical variables and writes the
average back to the four critical variables. The full error recovery
format is implemented for the computation block. However, the simulation
program does not simulate errors during error recovery.
The main functions of the simulation program are to execute the
recovery software, to monitor the software execution, to injected errors
into the program state, and to monitor recovery performance.
The recovery software is written as it would normally be written,
except that each program statement begins with a label (needed to
simulate sequence errors) and ends with a call to an error simulation
routine. In the absence of errors, the error simulation routine simply
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returns.
There are three types of errors injected: program sequence errors,
main memory errors, and processor memory errors. When the error
simulation routine is called, it first determines from the upset rate
if it is time for an upset to occur. If so, the simulation routine
then determines the type and location of the error from the system
parameters (see figure 3), as defined by the Upset Mapping Model and the
Structure/Content Model. These parameters are determined by hardware and
software specifications.
Simulation System Parameters
1) probability of main memory upset
given an upset to system (Upset Mapping Model)
2) probability of processor memory upset
given an upset to system (Upset Mapping Model)
3) probability of processor sequence upset
given an upset to system (Upset Mapping Model)
4) number of critical variables / total variables
(Upset Mapping Model)
5) initialization section size (in instructions)
(Structure/Content Model)
6) computation section size (in instructions)
(Structure/Content Model)
7) action section size (in instructions)
(Structure/Content Model)
8) time in the wait loop (for jump return to wait loop)
(software dependent)
9) frequency of upsets to system
(hardware dependent)
10) word size (in bits)
(hardware dependent)
11) n (size of upset) (in bits)
Figure 3
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Memory errors are simulated by simply changing variable values to
random numbers. An exception to this procedure is an error to an array
subscript. Array subscripts must be within a given range, otherwise
program execution is halted. Program sequence errors are simulated by
jumping to a random computation block statement.
The recovery metrics used are: number of catastrophes, coverage,
and recovery profile. The number of catastrophes requires the
classification of recovery failures. Since this task would be very
difficult to automate, it is done manually through various display
options. The display options used are:
1) display program code
2) display program data
3) display errors injected
4) display errors detected
5) display current section
6) display program data at injection
7) display program data at detection
8) display program data at beginning of block
9) display program data at end of block
Miscellaneous Assumptions
Here is a list of miscellaneous assumptions concerning the
implementation of the simulation program.
1) The number of bits upset is irrelevant if greater than one.
This assumption simplifies analysis by breaking the upsets into
two categories: the SEU case (number of bits upset equals one)
and the MBU case (number of bits upset is greater than one).
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This is not a perfect assumption, since the performance of
reasonableness checking increases as the number of bits upset
increases.
2) Although control programs are always time varying, it is assumed
that the effectiveness of recovery in not influenced by
time variance. Consequently, the simulated control program is
time invariant.
3) The simulation program does not simulate upsets during the
execution of the recovery block. It is assumed that upsets
which occur during recovery are important only during bursts of
upsets. The problem of recovering during recovery is not
addressed.
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Outline of Simulation Program
A summary of the simulation program is given in Figure 4.
program simulate;
{ initialization procedures }
procedure simulation;
{ initialization procedures }
{ display option procedures }
{ statistics gathering procedures }
procedure recoveryexample (blocknumber : integer);
{ manual upset injection procedures }
{ automatic upset injection procedures }
{ error simulation driver }
begin
{ software under test in recovery format
with calls to error injection routine }
{ recovery evaluation }
{ error recovery block }
end;
begin
while true do
begin
initialize;
for blocknumber := 1 to numberofblocks do
recoveryexample (blocknumber);
end;
end;
{ main program body }
begin
initializeparameters;
initializestats;
simulation;
end.
Figure 4
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THE SIMULATION PROGRAM LISTING
program simulate;
type
{ invariant - the probability of all outcomes should add to one }
mapping =
record
memory : real;
sequence real;
end;
displayoptions =
record
lines
data
errorsdetected
errors_injected
section
dataat_injection
data at detection
dataatstart
dataatend
end;
{ used by parameters }
{ the probability that a MBU affects a processor
memory location }
{ the probability that a MBU affects a program
sequence }
boolean;
boolean;
boolean;
boolean;
boolean;
boolean;
boolean;
boolean;
boolean;
{ parameter invariants -
processorsus + memorysus = 1
sectionlsize > 0
section2_size > 0
section3_size > 0
0 <= critcal variables <= 1
0 <= waitloop <= 1
wordsize > 0
0 <= n <= wordsize
error-period > 1 }
{ note : an error period of
block)
parameters =
record
processorsus
memorysus
neu-map
sectionlsize
section2_size ;
section3_size :
criticalvar
wait_loop
n
wordsize
errorperiod
testmode
display
factorl
factor2
factor3
133 is approximately one upset per
real; { the susceptibility of the processor to MBU's
real; { the susceptibility of the memory to MBU's
mapping; { the mapping of MBU's outcomes }
integer; { the size of a typical initialization section)
{ in number of instructions executed I
integer; { the size of a typical computation section}
{ in number of instructions executed }
integer; { the size of a typical action section}
{ in number of instructions executed }
real; { the percentage of critical variables }
real; { the percentage of time in the wait loop }
integer; { number of bits upset }
integer; { the word size of the processor }
integer32; { the mean period, in instructions, between MBU's
boolean; { enables change in display options }
displayoptions;
integer; { rate of upset in initializaton section }
integer; { rate of upset in computation section }
integer; { rate of upset in action section }
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end;
{ recovery profile }
profile =
record
redundantcomp
redundantstorage
memorycoding
scc
waitloop
reasonablenesscheck
end;
upset-type
record
wait_loop
sequence
processor memory
memory
end;
stats =
record
totalerrors
totalerrorscorrected:
totalcoverage
recovery
upset
end;
var
p : parameters;
a : stats;
seed, seedl : integer;
integer32;
integer32;
integer32;
integer32;
integer32;
integer32;
integer32;
integer32;
integer32;
integer32;
integer32; { the total number of errors injected }
integer32;
real; { the coverage of the whole system }
profile;
upsettype;
{ the parameters of the simulation }
{ the recovery data }
{ used to detirmine location and type of error }
procedure initfactors (var p : parameters);
{ this procedure calculates the local upset rate as specified by the
form/content model }
const
{ these numbers are the number of lines executed per section }
initsize 30;
calc_size = 30;
commitsize 54;
var
temp factorl, tempfactor2, temp_factor3 , average : real;
begin
with p do
begin
tempfactorl : init size / sectionlsize;
tempfactor2 : calcsize / section2_size;
tempfactor3 : commitsize / section3_size;
average : tempfactorl*initsize + temp_factor2*calcsize +
temp factor3*commit size;
average : average/(initsize + calcsize + commitsize);
factorl : trunc(tempfactorl * errorperiod / average);
factor2 : trunc(tempfactor2 * errorperiod / average);
factor3 : trunc(tempfactor3 * errorperiod / average);
end;
end;
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procedure initializeparameters (var p : parameters);
label
100;
var
ch char;
begin
{ assingn default values to parameters }
p.processorsus := 0.0;
p.memorysus := 1.0;
p.neu map.memory := 0.5;
p.neu map.sequence := 0.5;
p.sectionlsize 30;
p.section2_size 30;
p.section3_size 54;
p.critical_var 0.5;
p.wait_loop : 0.0;
p.wordsize 16;
p.n := 4;
p.errorperiod := 20;
p.testmode := true;
seed 5;
seedl : 10;
{ verify resulting parameters }
writeln('here are the default parameters: ');
writeln('processor susceptibility : , p.processor_sus:4:4);
writeln('memory susceptibility :, p.memorysus:4:4);
writeln('NEU -> memory mapping :, p.neu map.memory:4:4);
writeln('NEU -> sequence mapping , p.neu map.sequence:4:4);
writeln(initialization section size , p.sectionl size);
writeln('computation section size : , p.section2_.size);
writeln(action section size : , p.section3_size);
writeln('percentage of critical variables : , p.critical_var:4:4);
writeln('percentage of time in the wait loop : , p.wait_loop:4:4);
writeln('word size , p.wordsize);
writeln('n (size of upset) : , p.n);
writeln('mean period between upsets
p.errorperiod);
writeln('test mode : , p.testmode);
{ make changes to default parameters }
write('change parameters ? (y/n) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'y' then
repeat
write('change processor susceptibility ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
if ch = 'y' then
begin
repeat
write('processor susceptibility (real : 0 - 1)
readln(p.processorsus);
until (p.processor_sus >= 0) and (p.processorsus <= 1);
p.memory__,sus : 1 - p.processorsus;
end;
write('change memory susceptibility ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
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if ch = 'y' then
begin
repeat
write('memory susceptibility (real : 0 - 1)
readln(p.memory sus);
until (p.memorysus >= 0) and (p.memorysus <= 1);
p.processorsus 1 - p.memory_sus;
end;
write('change NEU outcome mapping ? (y/n/q) ');
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
if ch = 'y' then
repeat
writeln('probabilities must add to l');
repeat
write('memory upset probability (real 0 - 1)
readln(p.neunmap.memory);
until (p.neumap.memory >= 0) and (p.neu map.memory <= 1);
repeat
write('sequence upset probability (real : 0 - 1)
readln(p.neu map.sequence);
until (p.neumap.sequence >= 0) and (p.neu map.sequence <= 1);
until (p.neumap.memory + p.neujmap.sequence) = 1;
write('change initialization section size ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
if ch = 'y' then
repeat
write('initialization section size in executed instructions (integer > 0)
readin(p.sectionl size);
until p.sectionlsize > 0;
write('change computation section size ? (yln/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
if ch = 'y' then
repeat
write('computation section size in executed instructions (integer > 0) : ;
readln(p.section2_size);
until p.section2_size > 0;
write('change action section size ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
if ch = 'y' then
repeat
write('action section size in instructions (integer >= 1) : ;
readln(p.section3_size);
until p.section3_size > 0;
write('change percentage of critical variables ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
if ch = 'y' then
repeat
write('percentage of critical variables (real : 0 - 1) : ;
readln(p.critical var);
until (p.criticalvar >= 0) and (p.criticalvar <= 1);
write('change wait loop time ?
readln(ch);
(y/n/q) ');
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ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
ch = 'y' then
repeat
write('percentage of time in wait loop (real : 0 - 1) :
readln(p.wait_loop);
until (p.waitloop >= 0) and (p.wait_loop <- 1);
write('change word size ?
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
if ch = 'y' then
repeat
write('word size (integer > 0) :
readln(p.word_size);
until p.wordsize > 0;
write('change n (size of upset) ?
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
if ch = 'y' then
repeat
write('n (integer : 1 <= n <= word size)
readln(p.n);
until (p.n >= 1) and (p.n <= p.wordsize);
write('change error period ?
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
if ch = 'y' then
repeat
write('error period in instructions (integer
readln(p.errorperiod);
until p.errorperiod > 1;
write('change test mode ?
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 100;
if ch = 'y' then
begin
write('test mode (boolean) :
readln(p.testmode);
end;
{ verify resulting parameters }
writeln('here are the resulting parameters: ');
writeln('processor susceptibility : , p
writeln('memory susceptibility : , p
writeln('NEU -> memory mapping : , p
writeln('NEU 
-> sequence mapping : p
writeln('initialization section size : , p.sec
writeln('computation section size : p.sec
writeln(action section size : , p.sec
writeln('percentage of critical variables : p
writeln('percentage of time in the wait loop : , p
writeln('word size : ', p.wor
writeln('n (size of upset) : ,p.n);
writeln('mean period between upsets
p.errorperiod);
writeln('test mode : , p.tes
write(are these the desired parameters ? (y/n) );
readln(ch);
(y/n/q) ');
(y/n/q) ');
1;
(y/n/q) ');
>> 1) :
(y/n/q) ');
.processor sus:4:4);
.memorysus:4:4);
.neu map.memory:4:4);
.neumap.sequence:4:4);
tionl_size);
tion2_size);
tion3_size);
.criticalvar:4:4);
.wait_loop:4:4);
d-size);
t mode);
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if
if
100:
until not (ch = 'n');
initfactors(p);
if p.testmode then
begin
p.display.lines
p.display.data
p.display.errorsdetected
p.display.errorsinjected
p.display.section
p.display.dataat_injection
p.display.dataatdetection
p.display.dataatstart
p.display.dataatend
end
else
begin
p.display.lines
p.display.data
p.display.errorsdetected
p.display.errorsinjected
p.display.section
p.display.dataat_injection
p.display.data_atdetection
p.display.dataatstart
p.display.dataatend
end;
end;
procedure initializestats (var a : stats);
begin
with s do
begin
totalerrors
totalerrorscorrected
end;
recovery.redundantcomp
recovery.redundant_storage
recovery.memorycoding
recovery.scc
recovery.wait_loop
recovery.reasonablenesscheck
end;
procedure simulation(var p : parameters;var a : stats);
type
control
record
{simulation control data}
freerun : boolean; {
linebreak boolean; {
breakpointline : integer; {
error : boolean; {
skipblock : boolean; {
skipto line integer; {
errormessage string; {
numberofcomputations : integer;{
recoveryline : integer; {
end;
free run mode }
break point mode }
break point line number }
has an error been detected ? }
sequence error to another block}
skip to line number }
the cause of the last discovered error}
the actual number of computations }
the line number where error was detected}
{ values - the domain and range of average
e.g. average(values) -> values
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true;
false;
true;
true;
false;
true;
true;
true;
true;
false;
false;
false;
false;
false;
false;
false;
false;
false;
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
two copies of values are needed to allow atomic actions
three copies of the above are kept for redundant storage
temp - the extra copy of temp is used for repeating computions
block-number, valuenumber, copynumber
- the variables for iteration
tempversion
- toggles the temp variables
number-ofcomputations
- the cumulative number of computations
scc - sequence control code }
const
numberofblocks = 10;
numberoflines = 54;
numberofvalues = 4;
numbermof-copies = 3;
var
values : array [0..1,1..number_of_copies,
l..numberofvalues,1..numberof_blocks] of integer;
temp : array [0..91 of integer;
block number, valuenumber, copynumber, scc : integer;
number of computations, temp_yersion integer;
simdata : control;
il,i2,i3,i4 : integer;
procedure init;
begin
{ initialize program data }
scc := 003;
valuenumber 0;
copynumber 0;
{ initialize values [01 to blocknumber*100 }
for i2 := I to numberof copies do
for i := 1 to numberofvalues do
for i4 := 1 to numberofblocks do
begin
values [l,i2,i3,i4: i4 * 100;
values [0,i2,i3,i4] 0;
end;
for il := 0 to 9 do
temp [ill := 0;
number-of_computations := 0;
tempversion := 0;
{ initialize control data }
with simdata do
begin
freerun := false;
linebreak := false;
breakpointline := 100 + numberoflines;
error := false;
skipblock := false;
errormessage := ';
number of computations := 0;
recovery_line := 0;
end;
end;
function random(var seed : integer) : real;
begin
random := seed/65535 + 0.5;
seed := (25173 * seed + 13849) mod 65536;
end;
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function randomoffset(var seed : integer; amplitude : integer) : integer;
{ if the amplitude is less than 0, both positive and negative
offsets are allowed. If the amplitude is greater than 0,
only positive offsets are allowed. }
begin
if amplitude < 0 then
begin
randomoffset : trunc((seed/65535)*2*amplitude);
seed := (25173 * seed + 13849) mod 65536;
end
else
begin
randomoffset trunc((seed/65535 + 0.5)*amplitude);
seed := (25173 * seed + 13849) mod 65536;
end
end;
function reasonablelinenumber (linenumber : integer) : boolean;
{ this boolean function tests the reasonableness of a given linenumber
for manual control input }
begin
if ((linenumber mod 100) >= 1) and ((linenumber mod 100) <= numberoflines) and
((linenumber div 100) >= 1) and ((linenumber div 100) <= number_of_blocks) then
reasonable line number : true
else
reasonablelinenumber false;
end;
procedure display-section(block number, linenumber : integer);
{ this procedure displays the section currently being executed }
begin
case linenumber of
1: begin
writeln;
writeln;
writeln('block number is ', block-number);
writeln;
wri teln ('*******************************');
writeln(' section l');
writeln ('*******************************');
writeln;
end;
22: begin
writeln;
writeln;
writeln('block number is ', block-number);
writeln;
write ln('*******************************');
writeln(' section 2');
write ln('*******************************');
writeln;
end;
41: begin
writeln;
writeln;
writeln('block number is ', block-number);
writeln;
writeln(' *******************************);
writeln(' section 3');
write ln('*******************************);
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writeln;
end;
end; {case}
end;
procedure displaycomputation(blocknumber, line-number : integer);
{ this procedure displays the PASCAL program line currently being executed }
var
temp, templ : integer;
begin
writeln;
writeln;
writeln('block number is ', block number);
writeln('line number is ', line number);
writeln;
case linenumber of
1: writeln(' {initialize} ');
2: begin
temp := (blocknumber - 1)*100 + 3;
writeln(' if scc = ',temp,' then');
end;
3: begin
temp := blocknumber*100 + 1;
writeln(' sec temp,';');
end;
4: begin
writeln('else');
writeln(' goto 100;');
end;
5: begin
writeln(' {vote on values}');
writeln('valuenumber := 0;');
end;
6: begin
writeln('while valuenumber < numberofvalues do');
writeln(' begin');
end;
7: writeln(' value_number :- valuenumber + 1;');
8: begin
write(' if values [l,copy 1,valuenumber]
writeln('values [1,copy 2, value-number] ');
writeln(' then');
writeln(' begin');
end;
9: begin
write(' values [0,copy l,valuenumber] :
writeln('values [l,copy 1,valuenumberl;');
end;
10: begin
write(' values [O,copy 2,valuenumber] :
writeln('values [l,copy l,value numberl;');
end;
11: begin
write(' values [0,copy 3,valuenumber] :
writeln('values [l,copy l,value-numberl;');
writeln(' next;');
writeln('end;');
end;
12: begin
write(' if values [l,copy 2,valuenumber]
writeln('values [l,copy 3,valuenumber]');
writeln(' then ');
writeln(' begin');
end;
13: begin
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write(' values [0,copy 1,valuenumber]
writeln('values [1,copy 2,value number];');
end;
14: begin
write(' values [0,copy 2,valuenumber] :=
writeln('values [l,copy 2,value number];');
end;
15: begin
write(' values [0,copy 3,valuenumber] :
writeln('values [l,copy 2,value number];');
writeln(' next;');
writeln(' end;');
end;
16: begin
write(' if values [l,copy 1,valuenumber] =
writeln('values [l,copy 3,value number] ');
writeln(' then');
writeln(' begin');
end;
17: begin
write(' values [0,copy 1,value number] : ';
writeln('values [l,copy l,value-numberl;');
end;
18: begin
write(' values [0,copy 2,valuenumber] :
writeln('values [l,copy l,value numberl;');
end;
19: begin
write(' values [0,ropy 3,valuenumber] :
writeln('values [1,copy 1,value-number];');
writeln(' next;');
writeln(' end;');
writeln('end;');
end;
20: writeln(' temp-yersion := 0;');
21: writeln(' number of computations := 0;');
22: begin
writeln(' {calculate values}');
temp := block number*100 + 1;
writeln('if sec : ',temp,' then');
end;
23: begin
temp := blocknumber*100 + 2;
writeln('scc := ',temp,';');
end;
24: begin
writeln('else');
writeln(' goto 100');
end;
25: writeln(' repeat');
26: begin
temp := (temp-version + 1) mod 2;
writeln(' temp-yersion := ',temp,'; ');
end;
27: writeln(' temp [temp version] := 0;');
28: writeln(' number of computations := numberof computations + 1;');
29: writeln(' value_number := 0;');
30: writeln(' while valuenumber < numberofvalues do');
31: begin
writeln(' begin');
writeln(' valuenumber := valuenumber + 1;');
end;
32: begin
write(' temp [temp_version] := temp [tempversion] ');
writeln('+ values [0,copy 1,valuejnumber];');
writeln('end;');
end;
33: begin
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write(' temp [tempversion] := temp [temp-yersion] );
writeln('div numberofvalues;');
end;
34: writeln(' temp [tempversion] temp [temp_yersion] - 10;');
35: writeln(' temp [tempversion] := temp [tempversion] - 5;');
36: writeln(' temp [tempversion] temp [temp_yersion] + block number;');
37: writeln(' temp [tempyersion] temp [tempversion] + 15;');
38: begin
write(' until (number of computations > 1) and ');
write('(temp [0] = temp [1]);');
end;
39: begin
temp := blocknumber * 101 - 5;
templ := blocknumber * 101 + 5;
writeln(' {check resonableness} );
write(if (temp [temp_yersion] < ',temp,') or
writeln('(temp [temp_yersion] > ',templ,') then ');
end;
40: writeln(' goto 100;');
41: begin
writeln(' (assign values} ');
temp := blocknumber*100 + 2;
writeln('if scc =, temp, ' then');
end;
42: begin;
temp := blocknumber*100 + 3;
writeln('scc := ',temp,';');
end;
43: begin
writeln('else');
writeln(' goto 100;');
end;
44: writeln(' valuenumber := 0;');
45: begin
writeln('
writeln('
end;
writeln('
writeln('
begin
writeln('
writeln(
while valuenumber < numberofvalues do');
begin ');
valuenumber : valuenumber + 1;');
copy.number := 0; ');
while copynumber < number_of_copies do );
begin ');
end;
49: writeln(' copy number := copynumber + 1;');
50: begin
writeln(' values [1,copynumber,value number]
writeln(' end;');
writeln('end;');
end;
51: begin
writeln(' {scc check}');
temp := block-number*100 + 3;
writeln('(if scc <> ',temp,') then');
end;
writeln('
:= temp [11;');
goto 100; ');
begin
writeln(' { reasonableness check }');
write('if (valuenumber <> numberof_values) or
writeln('(copy_number <> numberof copies) or
writeln('(temp [0] <> temp [1]) then');
end;
54: writeln(' goto 100; ');
otherwise writeln('ERROR : unhandled case, display computation');
end; {case)
writeln;
writeln;
end; (display computation}
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46:
47:
48:
52:
53:
procedure displaydata;
{ this procedure displays all the data values of the simulated
recovery block }
begin
writeln;
writeln;
for i3 := 1 to numberofvalues do
for i2 := 1 to number-of-copies do
for il := 0 to 1 do
writeln('values [',il:2,', ',i2:2,', ',i3:2,']= '
values [il,i2,i3,blocknumber]);
writeln('temp [01 = , temp [0]);
writeln('temp [1] = , temp [11);
writeln('scc ,sc);
writeln('numberof_computations = ', numberofcomputations);
writeln('temp version = , tempversion);
writeln('blocknumber = , blocknumber);
writeln('valuenumber = , valuenumber);
writeln('copy number = , copy.number);
end;
procedure change data;
{ this procedure allows the user to manually
recovery block }
label
200;
var
ch : char;
tempvalue : integer;
change any data used by the
begin
write('change values ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
for i3 := 1 to numberofvalues do
for i2 := 1 to numberofcopies do
for il := 0 to 1 do
begin
write('change values ,il,', ,i2,', ',i3,'] ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
begin
write('values [,il,', ,i2,', ',i3,'] =
readln(tempvalue);
values [il,i2,i3,blockjnumber] := tempyalue;
end;
end;
write('change temp [0] ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch - 'y' then
begin
write('temp [0] = ;
readln(temp value);
temp [01 := tempyalue;
end;
write('change temp [11 ? (y/n/q) ';
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readln(ch);
if ch - 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
begin
write('temp [1]
readln(temp yalue);
temp [1] := temp_yalue;
end;
write('change sCC ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch - 'y' then
begin
write('scc =
readln(scc);
end;
write('change number_ofcomputations ? (y/n/q) ');
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
begin
write('numberofcomputations = ';
readln(number_of_computations);
end;
write('change tempyersion ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
begin
write('temp_yersion = ;
readln(temp_yersion);
end;
write('change blocknumber 7 (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
begin
write('blocknumber = ;
readln(block_number);
end;
write('change valuenumber ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
begin
write('valuenumber =
readln(value_number);
end;
write('change copynumber ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch - 'y' then
begin
write('copynumber =;
readln(copy_number);
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end;
200:
end;
procedure change-displayoptions;
{ this procedure allows the user to change the display options }
label
200;
var
ch : char;
begin
write('display lines ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
p.display.lines : true
else
p.display.lines := false;
write('display data ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
p.display.data : true
else
p.display.data : false;
write('display errors detected ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
p.display.errorsdetected : true
else
p.display.errorsdetected : false;
write('display errors injected ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
p.display.errorsinjected : true
else
p.display.errorsinjected false;
write('display section ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
p.display.section 1= true
else
p.display.section := false;
write('display data after upset injection 7 (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
p.display.data at_injection : true
else
p.display.dataat_injection : false;
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write('display data after upset detection ? (y/n/q) ');
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
p.display.dataatdetection true
else
p.display.dataatdetection false;
write('display data at start of block ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch - 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch - 'y' then
p.display.dataat_start true
else
p.display.dataatstart false;
write('display data at end of block ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y then
p.display.dataatend : true
else
p.display.dataatend : false;
200:
end;
procedure freerun;
{ this procedure allows the user to specify a free run (otherwise,
the program is halted after each instruction). There are two
free run modes : break on line and break on error }
var
ch : char;
begin
simdata.freerun := true;
write('break on line ? (y/n) ');
readln(ch);
if ch = 'y' then
begin
simdata.linebreak := true;
writeln('sequence numbers have the form ');
writeln(' (block number) * 100 + line number');
writeln('for example, to jump to line number 5 in block 5,');
writeln('use sequence number 505');
writeln;
repeat
write('break at which sequence number ? ');
write('( integer : sequence number > 101 ) :
readln(simdata.breakpointline);
until reasonablelinenumber(simdata.break pointline);
end
else
begin
write('break on error ? (y/n) ');
readln(ch);
if ch = 'y' then
sim data.linebreak := false;
end;
end;
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procedure displayerror (var simdata : control);
{ this procedure displays the recovery profile }
begin
with s.recovery do
begin
(display error}
writeln;
writeln;
writeln(simdata.errormessage);
{display profile}
writeln;
writeln;
writeln(' error recovery profile ');
writeln(' redundant computation ,redundant-comp);
writeln(' redundant storage ,redundant storage);
writeln(' memory coding : , memorycoding);
writeln(' sequence control codes : ', scc);
writeln(' wait loop check : ', wait-loop);
writeln(' reasonableness check : , reasonablenesscheck);
end;
end;
procedure recoveryprofile (var s : stats;var simdata : control; line : integer);
{ this procedure maintains the recovery profile statistics, and displays errors
detected, if opted }
begin
simdata.error := false;
with s.recovery do
case line of
4: begin
simdata.error := true;
simdata.error message
sequence error, found on line 4, by sequence control codes';
scc := scc + 1;
end;
8: if values [1,3,value number,block number] <>
values [1,1,valuenumber,block number] then
begin
simdata.error := true;
simdata.errormessage
'data error, found on line 8, by redundant storage';
redundantstorage := redundantstorage + 1;
end;
12: if values [1,1,value number,blocknumber] <>
values [1,2,valuenumber,block number] then
begin
sim data.error := true;
simdata.errormessage
'data error, found on line 12, by redundant storage;
redundantstorage := redundantstorage + 1;
end;
16: if values [1,1,value number,blocknumber] <>
values [1,2,valuenumber,block number I then
begin
simdata.error := true;
simdata.errormessage
'data error, found on line 16, by redundant storage';
redundantstorage := redundantstorage + 1;
end;
21: simdata.number-of computations := 0;
24: begin
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simdata.error := true;
simdata.error message
sequence error, found on line 24, by sequence control codes';
scc := scc +
end;
28: simdata.number of computations := simdata.numberof-computations + 1;
38: if simdata.number_of_computations > 2 then
begin
simdata.error := true;
simdata.error_message
'data error, found on line 38, by redundant computations';
redundantcomp := redundant_comp +
(simdata.number-of-computations -1) div 2;
end;
40: begin
simdata.error := true;
simdata.error message
'data error, found on line 40, by reasonableness checks';
reasonablenesscheck := reasonablenesscheck + 1;
end;
43: begin
simdata.error := true;
simdata.errormessage
sequence error, found on line 43, by sequence control codes';
scc := scc + 1;
end;
52: begin
simdata.error := true;
simdata.errormessage
sequence error, found on line 52, by sequence control codes';
scc := scC + 1;
end;
54: begin
simdata.error := true;
simdata.errormessage
'data error, found on line 54, by reasonableness checks';
reasonablenesscheck := reasonablenesscheck + 1;
end;
end; {case}
if simdata.error then
simdata.recoveryline := line;
if simdata.error and p.display.errorsdetected then
displayerror(simdata);
if simdata.error and p.display.dataatdetection then
displaydata;
end;
procedure recoveryexample(var blocknumber : integer);
label
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,
21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,
38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,99,100;
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const
sccl = 4;
scc2 = 24;
scc3 = 43;
scc4 = 52;
real = 40;
rea2 = 54;
procedure jump (jumpto : integer);
{ this procedure allows PASCAL to make arbitrary program jumps. Note that
x := 5;
goto x;
is illegal }
begin
case jumpto of
1: goto 1;
2: goto 2;
3: goto 3;
4: goto 4;
5: goto 5;
6: goto 6;
7: goto 7;
8: goto 8;
9: goto 9;
10: goto 10;
11: goto 11;
12: goto 12;
13: goto 13;
14: goto 14;
15: goto 15;
16: goto 16;
17: goto 17;
18: goto 18;
19: goto 19;
20: goto 20;
21: goto 21;
22: goto 22;
23: goto 23;
24: goto 24;
25: goto 25;
26: goto 26;
27: goto 27;
28: goto 28;
29: goto 29;
30: goto 30;
31: goto 31;
32: goto 32;
33: goto 33;
34: goto 34;
35: goto 35;
36: goto 36;
37: goto 37;
38: goto 38;
39: goto 39;
40: goto 40;
41: goto 41;
42: goto 42;
43: goto 43;
44: goto 44;
45: goto 45;
46: goto 46;
47: goto 47;
48: goto 48;
49: goto 49;
50: goto 50;
51: goto 51;
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52: goto 52;
53: goto 53;
54: goto 54;
99: goto 99;
end;
writeln('ERROR : illegal jump );
end;
procedure processor memoryupset;
{ this procedure is used to automatically inject processor memory errors }
var
offset_amplitude : integer;
upset-version, upset-copy, upsetvalue : integer;
begin
{ processor memory upset)
if p.display.errorseinjected then
begin
writeln;
writeln;
writeln('*******************************);
writeln(' processor memory upset');
writeln('*******************************);
simdata.error := true;
writeln;
writeln;
end;
s.upset.processormemory := s.upset.processor memory + 1;
case trunc(random(seed)*9 + 1) of
1 begin
{ values upset)
offsetamplitude := -10000;
upset-version := randomoffset(seedl,1);
upset-copy randomoffset(seedl,number of copies) + 1;
upset-value : randomoffset(seedl,numberofvalues) + 1;
values[upset version,upset-copy,upset value,block-numberl
values[upsetversion,upset-copy,upset value,block-numberl +
randomoffset(seedl,offset amplitude);
if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln(' values[',upset version,',',upsetcopy,
upset-value,'] = ',
values[upset-version,upset-copy,upsetvalue,blocknumberI );
end;
2 : begin
{ values upset)
offsetamplitude := -10000;
upset version := randomoffset(seedl,1);
upset-copy := randomoffset(seedl,number of copies) + 1;
upset-value : randomoffset(seedl,numberof_values) + 1;
values[upsetversion,upset-copy,upset value,block-number]
values[upsetversion,upset-copy,upset-value,block-number] +
randomoffset(seedl,offset amplitude);
if p.display.errors injected then
writeln(' values[,upset version,',',upset-copy,',',
upset-value,'l = ',
values[upset-version,upsetcopy,upset value,blocknumber] );
end;
{ upset non-critical variable }
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3 : begin
offsetamplitude := -10000;
temp[O] := temp[0] + randomoffset(seedl,offset amplitude);
if p.display.errors injected then
writeln(' temp[0] =, temp[0]);
end;
4 begin
offsetamplitude := -10000;
temp[l] := temp[1] + randomoffset(seedl,offset amplitude);
if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln(' temp[1] = ,temp[1]);
end;
5 : begin
valuenumber := randomoffset(seedl,numberofvalues) + 1;
if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln(' valuenumber = ', valuenumber);
end;
6 begin
copynumber := random offset(seedl,number of copies) + 1;
if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln(' copynumber = ', copynumber);
end;
7 begin
offsetamplitude :- -10000;
sCc := sCC + random_offset(seedl,offset amplitude);
if p.display.errors injected then
writeln(' scc = , scc);
end;
8 :begin
offsetamplitude -10000;
numberof_computations := number of computations
+ randomoffset(seedl,offset amplitude);
if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln('numberof.computations = ',numberofcomputations);
end;
9 begin
tempversion := random offset(seedl,numberofblocks);
if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln('temp-version = ',temp-version);
end;
otherwise writeln('ERROR : illegal non-critical variable upset');
end; {case}
if p.display.dataatinjection then
displaydata;
end;
procedure sequence upset;
{ this procedure is used to automatically inject sequence upsets }
var
upset-block, upset-line : integer;
begin
{sequence error}
if p.display.errorsinjected then
begin
writeln;
writeln;
writeln('*******************************);
writeln(' sequence upset upset');
write ln('*******************************');
simdata.error := true;
writeln;
writeln;
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end;
S.upset.sequence := s.upset.sequence + 1;
upset-block randomoffset(seedl,numberofblocks) + 1;
upset_line random offset(seedl,numberoflines) + 1;
simdata.skipto line := 100*upset block + upsetline;
if p.display.errors_injected then
writeln(' sequence skiped to line ',simdata.skiptoline);
if upset-block <> blocknumber then
begin
sim_data.skip_block := true;
goto 99;
end
else
jump(upset_line);
end;
procedure memoryupset;
{ this procedure is used to automatically inject main memory upsets }
var
offset_amplitude, upset-block : integer;
upset version, upset copy, upsetvalue integer;
begin
{memory error}
if p.display.errorsinjected then
begin
writeln;
writeln;
writeln('*******************************);
writeln(' memory upset');
write ln( '*******************************')
simdata.error := true;
writeln;
writeln;
end;
s.upset.memory := s.upset.memory + 1;
if random(seed) < p.criticalvar then
begin
{ upset critical variable }
{ chose upset block }
upsetblock := randomoffset(seedl,numberofblocks) + 1;
{ values upset)
offset amplitude := -10000;
upsetversion :- randomoffset(seedl,2);
upsetcopy randomoffset(seedl,number ofscopies) + 1;
upsetvalue random_offset(seedl,number of values) + 1;
values[upset-version,upset-copyupset-value,upset-block:
values[upsetversionupset copy,upset-value,upset-block +
randomoffset(seedl,offset-amplitude);
if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln(' values[',upset version,',',upset-copy,',',
upset value,',',upset block,'] = '
values[upset-version,upset-copyupset-value,upset-block] );
end
else
begin
{ upset non-critical variable }
case trunc(random(seed)*7 + 1) of
1: begin
offsetamplitude := -10000;
temp[0] := temp[0] + random offset(seedl,offset amplitude);
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if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln(' temp[0] = , temp[O]);
end;
2: begin
offsetamplitude := -10000;
temp[l] := temp[l] + randomoffset(seedl,offset amplitude);
if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln(' temp[l] , temp[I);
end;
3: begin
value-number := randomoffset(seedl,numberofvalues) + 1;
if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln(' valuenumber = ', value-number);
end;
4: begin
copynumber := randomoffset(seedl,number-of-copies) + 1;
if p.display.errors injected then
writeln(' copynumber = ', copynAumber);
end;
5: begin
offsetamplitude := -10000;
scc := sCC + random offset(seedl,offset amplitude);
if p.display.errors injected then
writeln(' scc , scc);
end;
6: begin
offsetamplitude : -10000;
numberofcomputations := numberofcomputations
+ randomoffset(eeedl,offset amplitude);
if p.display.errors injected then
writeln('number-of-computations = ',number of computations);
end;
7: begin
tempversion := random_offset(seedl,number ofblocks);
if p.display.errorsinjected then
writeln('temp version = ',temp version);
end;
otherwise writeln(ERROR : illegal non-critical variable upset');
end; {case}
end;
if p.display.data atinjection then
displaydata;
end;
procedure upset(var p : parameters);
{ given that an upset has occurred, this procedure detirmines where
it has occurred }
begin
(inject error)
if (p.n = 1) and (random(seed) < p.wait loop) then
begin
{upset in wait loop}
s.upset.wait loop := s.upset.wait loop +1;
end
else
if random(seed) < p.processorsus then
begin
{ processor error }
if random(seed) < p.neu map.memory then
processor memoryjupset
else
sequence-upset;
end
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else
memory ipset;
end;
procedure inject-upset(var p : parameters; line : integer);
{ this procedure detirmines when an upset occurs, using the
different upset rates }
const
startofinit = 1;
end ofinit = 21;
start of calc = 22;
end ofcalc = 38;
startofcommit = 39;
endofcommit = 54;
begin
if (line >= startofinit) and (line <= endofinit) then
begin
if trunc(random(seed) * p.factorl) = 1 then
upset(p);
end
else
if (line >= startofcalc) and (line <= endofcalc) then
begin
if trunc(random(seed) * p.factor2) = 1 then
upset(p);
end
else
if (line >= start of commit) and (line <= end-of commit) then
begin
if trunc(random(seed) * p.factor3) = 1 then
upset(p);
end
end;
procedure freerun mode(line : integer);
begin
inject upset(p,line);
if simdata.linebreak then
begin
if blocknumber * 100 + line
simdata.breakpoint line then
begin
simdata.linebreak := false;
simdata.freerun := false
end;
end
else
if simdata.error then
begin
simdata.freerun := false;
simdata.error := false;
end;
if p.display.section then
displaysection(blocknumber, line);
if p.display.lines then
display-computation(blocknumber, line);
end;
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procedure changesequence;
begin
writeln('sequence numnber have the form ');
writeln(' (block number) * 100 + line number');
writeln('for example, to jump to line number 5 in block 5,');
writeln('use sequence number 505');
writeln;
write('input next sequence number (integer)
readln(sim data. skiptoline);
if (simdata.skiptoline div 100) <> blocknumber then
begin
simdata.skip_block := true;
goto 99;
end
else
begin
jump(simdata.skiptoline mod 100);
end;
end;
procedure recoveryevaluation;
var
b,v : integer;
begin
{ the test - at
b blocknumber;
v blocknumber
if
(((values[l,1,1,bI
(values[1,2,1,b]
((values[1,1,1,b]
(values[1,3,1,b]
((values[1,2,1,b]
(values[1,3,1,b]
and
(((values[1,1,2,b]
(values[1,2,2,b]
((values[1,1,2,b]
(values[1,3,2,b]
((values[1,2,2,b]
(values[1,3,2,b]
and
(((values[1,1,3,b]
(values[1,2,3,b]
((values[1,1,3,b]
(values[1,3,3,b]
((values[1,2,3,b]
(values[1,3,3,b]
then
least 2 out
* 101;
= v ) and
= v )) or
v ) and
v )) or
= v ) and
= v)))
= v ) and
= v )) or
= v ) and
= V )) or
= v ) and
= v)))
= v ) and
= v )) or
= v ) and
= v )) or
= v ) and
= v)))
begin
writeln;
writeln;
writeln('recovery
end
else
begin
writeln;
writeln;
writeln('recovery
end;
end;
of 3 critical values must be correct }
is successful');
has failed');
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procedure errorsim( line : integer);
label
200;
var
ch : char;
automated : boolean;
begin
automated := false;
recoveryprofile(s,sim data,line);
if simdata.skipblock then
begin
if line = 1 then
begin
simdata.skipblock := false;
jump( simdata.skipto_line mod 100);
end
else
writeln('ERROR : illegal skipblock in procedure error sim');
end;
if automated then
begin
inject upset(p,line);
if simdata.error then
displayerror(simdata);
end
else { manual error simulation }
if simdata.freerun then
freerunmode(line)
else
begin
if p.display.lines then
displaycomputation(blocknumber,line);
if p.display.data then
displaydata;
write(examine variables ? (y/n/q) ');
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
displaydata;
write(change variables ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = y then
change-data;
write('change sequence ? (y/n/q) );
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
changesequence;
write('free run ? (y/n/q) ';
readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
freerun;
if p.testmode then
begin
write(change display options ? (y/n/q) );
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readln(ch);
if ch = 'q' then
goto 200;
if ch = 'y' then
change displayoptions;
end;
begin
if p.display.dataatstart then
displaydata;
{initialize}
if sec = (blocknumber-l)*100 + 3 then
begin
scc := blocknumber*100 + 1;
end
else
begin
goto 100;
end;
{vote on values}
valuenumber := 0;
while valuenumber < numberofvalues do
begin
valuenumber := valuenumber + 1;
if values [1,1,valuenumber,block number] =
values [1,2, valuenumber,block number]
then
begin
values [0,1,value number,blocknumber]
values [1,1,valuenumberblock number];
values [0,2,value number,blocknumber] :=
values [1,1,valuenumber,block number];
values [0,3,valueTnumber,blocknumber] :=
values [1,1,value_number,block number];
next;
end;
if values [1,2,valuenumber,block number] =
values [1,3,valuenumber,block number]
then
begin
values [0,1,value-number,blocknumber]
values [1,2,valuenumber,block number];
values [0,2,valueInumber,blocknumber] :=
values [1,2,valuenumber,block-number];
values [0,3,value number,blocknumber :=
values [1,2,valuenumber,block-number];
next;
end;
if values [1,1,valuenumber,block number]
values [1,3,valuenumber,block number]
then
begin
values [0,1,value-number,blocknumber]
errorsim(l);
errorsim(2);
errorsim(3);
errorsim(2);
errorsim(4);
errorsim(5);
errorsim(6);
errorsim(7);
errorsim(8);
errorsim(9);
errorsim(10)
error_sim(ll)
errorsim(12)
errorsim(13)
error_sim(14)
errorsim(15)
errorsim(16)
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200:
end;
end
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
values [1,1,valuenumber,block number];
values [0,2,valueTnumber,blocknumber] :=
values [1,1,valuenumber,block number];
values [0,3,value-number,blocknumber] :=
values [1,1,valuenumber,block number];
end;
end;
next;
temp_yersion := 0;
numberofcomputations := 0;
{initialization complete}
{calculate values}
if sCC = blocknumber*100 + I then
begin
scc := blocknumber*100 + 2;
end
else
begin
goto 100;
end;
repeat
temp yersion := (tempversion + 1) mod 2;
temp [tempversion] := 0;
numberof_computations := number of computations + 1;
valuenumber := 0;
while valuenumber < numberofvalues do
begin
valuenumber := valuenumber + 1;
temp [temp_yersion] := temp [temp_version]
+ values [0,1,value-number,blocknumber];
end;
temp [tempversion] : temp (tempversion] div numberofvalues;
temp [temp_yersion] : temp [tempversion] - 10;
temp [temp version] : temp [temp_yersion] - 5;
temp [temp_yersion] : temp [temp_yersion] + block number;
temp [temp_yersion] : temp [tempversion] + 15;
until (number of computations > 1) and (temp [0] = temp [1]);
{check resonableness}
if (temp [temp version] < block number * 101 - 5)
or (temp [tempversion] > blocknumber * 101 + 5) then
begin
goto 100;
end;
{assign values}
if scc = blocknumber*100 + 2 then
begin
scc := blocknumber*100 + 3;
end
else
begin
goto 100;
end;
valuenumber := 0;
while valuenumber < numberofvalues do
errorsim(17)
errorsim(18)
errorsim(19)
error_sim(20)
errorsim(21)
22:
23:
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18:
19:
20:
21:
errorsim(22)
errorsim(23)
error_sim(22)
errorsim(24)
errorsim(25)
errorsim(26)
error_sim(27)
error sim(28)
errorsim(29)
errorsim(30)
error_sim(31)
errorsim(32)
errorsim(33)
errorsim(34)
error_sim(35)
errorsim(36)
error_sim(37)
errorsim(38)
errorsim(39)
error sim(40)
errorsim(41)
error_sim(42)
errorsim(41)
errorsim(43)
errorsim(44)
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:
35:
36:
37:
38:
39:
40:
41:
42:
43:
44:
45:
begin
valuenumber valuenumber + 1;
copy number 0;
while copynumber < numberofcopies do
begi
errorsim(45)
errorsim(46)
errorsim(47)
n error sim(48)
copynumber := copynumber + 1; errorsim(49)
values [l,copynumber,valuenumber,block number] : temp [1];
errorsim(50)
end;
end;
{ scc check }
if (scc <> blocknumber*100 + 3)
then
begin errorsim(51)
errorsim(52)
goto 100;
end;
51:
52:
53:
54:
jump (sim data. skiptoline);
end
else
begin
{ scc upset - reset scc and restart at scc }
if (simdata.recovery_line = sccl) then
begin
scc := (block-number - 1) * 100 + 3;
writeln(' **********************************);
writeln(' recovery block 2 - goto ',sccl - 2);
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46:
47:
48:
49:
50:
{ reasonableness check }
if (valuenumber <> numberofvalues) or (copy-number <> numberof-copies)
or (temp [0] <> temp [11) then
begin errorsim(53)
errorsim(54)
goto 100;
end;
if p.display.dataatend then
displaydata;
recoveryevaluation;
goto 99;
writeln(error detected, restarting computation');
if (simdata.recoveryline = sccl) or (simdata.recovery-line = scc2) or
(simdata.recovery line = scc3) or (simdata.recovery_line scc4) then
{ sequence upset detected }
begin
if reasonablelinenumber(scc) then
begin
{restart at the old scc}
blocknumber := scc div 100
case (scc mod 100) of
1: simdata.skiptoline : sccl + 1;
2: simdata.skipto_line : scc2 + 1;
3: simdata.skiptoline : scc3 + 1;
end; {case}
writeln( '**********************************');
writeln(' recovery block 1 - goto ',sim data.skiptoline);
writeln(' scc = ',sec);
writeln('"**********************************');
100:
writeln(' scc = 'sc);
writeln('**********************************');
jump (sccl - 2);
end;
if (simdata.recovery_line = scc2) then
begin
sec := blocknumber * 100 + 1;
writeln( '**********************************');
writeln(' recovery block 3 - goto ',scc2 - 2);
writeln(' scc = ',scc);
writein ('**********************************');
jump (scc2 - 2);
end;
if (simdata.recoveryline scc3) then
begin
scc := blocknumber * 100 + 2;
writeln('**********************************');
writeln(' recovery block 4 - goto ',scc3 - 2);
writeln(' scc = ,scc);
write ln('**********************************');
jump (scc3 - 2);
end;
if (simdata.recoveryline scc4) then
begin
scc := blocknumber * 100 + 3;
writeln('**********************************');
writeln(' recovery block 5 - goto ',scc4 - 1);
writeln(' scc = ',scc);
write ln('**********************************');
jump (scc4 - 1);
end;
end;
end
else
if (simdata.recoveryline = real) then
{ reasonableness check }
begin
if reasonablelinenumber(scc) then
begin
{restart at the old block, line 1}
blocknumber := scc div 100 ;
simdata.skiptojline := sccl + 1;
writeln('"**********************************');
writeln(' recovery block 6 - goto ',sim data.skiptojline);
writeln(' scc = ',scc);
write ln('**********************************');
jump (sim-data.skiptojline);
end
else
begin
{restart at block 1, line 1}
blocknumber := 0;
initialize stats(s);
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init;
write ln('"**********************************');
writeln(' recovery block 7 - restart');
writeln(' scc = ,scc);
writeln(**********************************');
end;
end
else
if (simdata.recovery_line = rea2) then
{ reasonableness check }
begin
if reasonablelinenumber(scc) then
begin
if (temp [01 <> temp [11) then
begin
{restart at current block, line 1}
scc := (blocknumber)*100 + 1;
write ln('**********************************);
writeln(' recovery block 8 - goto ',scc2 - 4);
writeln(' scc = ',scc);
write ln('**********************************');
jump (scc2 - 4);
end
else
begin
{redo update}
write ln('**********************************);
writeln(' recovery block 9 - goto ',scc3 + 1);
writeln(' scc = ',scc);
write ln('"**********************************');
jump (scc3 + 1);
end
end
else
begin
{restart at block 1, line 1}
blocknumber := 0;
initialize_stats(s);
init;
writeln(' recovery block 10 - restart');
writeln(' scc = ',ecc);
write ln('**********************************');
end;
end
else
if reasonable line number(scc) then
begin
{restart at the old scc}
blocknumber := scc div 100
case (scc mod 100) of
1: simdata.skip_toline sccl + 1;
2: simdata.skip_toline scc2 + 1;
3: simdata.skip_toline scc3 + 1;
end; {case}
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writeln('
writeln('
writeln('
writeln('
recovery block 11 - goto
scc = ,scc);
',sim data.skiptoline);
jump (simdata.skip_toline);
end;
99:
end;
(main body - simulation }
begin
while true do
begin
init;
for block-number := 1 to number of blocks do
begin
recoveryexample (block number );
if simdata.skipblock then
blocknumber := (simdata.skipto_line div 100) - 1;
end;
end;
end;
{ main program body }
begin
initialize_parameters(p);
initialize stats(s);
simulation(p, s);
end.
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************* *********'
GLOSSARY
This is a glossary of words used throughout this document
autonomous spacecraft maintenance (ASM):
The goal of ASM is to provide spacecraft the ability to function
for a specified period of time without ground support. ASM
requires autonomous health and maintenance, navigation and
stationkeeping, mission sequencing, as well as autonomous hardware
fault recovery.
action section:
A section of code where any action is committed and performed.
In this section, critical variables are assigned or output
operations are performed. The objective is to keep the action
section as short as possible in order to minimize the probability
of upset during the execution of this section.
atomic actions:
Atomic actions are traditionally used in data base concurrency
control [9]. The objective of atomic actions is to make actions
appear indivisible, that is, all other actions appear to have
occurred either before or after an atomic transaction. Furthermore,
atomic actions appear to completely happened (commit) or never
happen (abort).
A process experiencing transient errors can be considered to be two
processes, the actual process and the transient error process.
The objective of using atomic actions in transient error recovery
is in insure that all transient errors occur either before or
123
after an action but not during.
block:
To apply the proposed transient error recovery technique to a
program, it must be divided into blocks, which are similar to a
procedures. Each block is associated with either a critical
variable or an output operation or both. Each block is divided
into three idempotent sections : an initial section, a computation
section, and an action section.
catastrophe:
An event which is the result of an upset, which a transient
error recovery technique may not recover without re-initialization
and restart, if at all. In terms of ASM, a catastrophic upset
implies that autonomy may be compromised. In terms of mission
success, the result of a catastrophic upset is undefined.
Catastrophes are divided into two categories : first-order
catastrophes, which result from one upset and second-order
catastrophes, which result from two upsets.
computation block:
To apply the proposed transient error recovery technique to a
program, it must be divided into blocks, which are similar to a
procedures. Each block is associated with either a critical
variable or an output operation or both. Each block is divided
into three idempotent sections : an initial section, a computation
section, and an action section.
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computation section:
The section of code where the actual computation takes place. All
computations are performed using temporary variables to insure the
idempotence of the section and to limit the possibility of error
propagation. The computation is performed at least twice, until
two results in a row agree. For time variant systems, results must
agree within a pre-defined margin.
control variables:
Control variables are program variables used to control data access
and program flow. Control variables include subscripts, counters,
flags, sequence control codes, etc.
coverage:
Coverage is defined in reliability theory [8] as the conditional
probability that a failure of a unit will be detected and
appropriate recovery action will be performed given the occurrence
of a fault and sufficient resources for recovery. Since the
addressed phenomenon are transient in nature, no resources are
required for transient error recovery. For transient errors,
coverage is a metric of a systems' error detection and recovery
action capability.
critical flip-flops:
Critical flip-flops are flip-flops within the processor and its
supporting logic which can result in a catastrophe if upset, and
are not covered by Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery.
Since they are referred to as "flip-flops" (as opposed to
"registers"), the implication is that they typically hold control
information as opposed to value information, their criticalness has
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a high duty-cycle. Thus, most upsets to critical flip-flops are
catastrophic.
critical registers:
Critical registers are registers within the processor and its
supporting logic which can result in a catastrophe if upset, and
are not covered by Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery.
Since they are referred to as "registers" (as opposed to
"flip-flops"), the implication is that they typically hold value
information as opposed to control information, their criticalness
has a low duty-cycle. Thus, an upset during a non-critical period,
such as the execution of a wait loop, is not catastrophic.
critical variables:
Critical variables are program variables which have a direct effect
upon some output of the system. Non-critical variables have effect
on the output of the system, but only through their effect upon
critical variables. Another way of looking at this distinction is
that if there were only a single copy of a critical variable, and
if that copy were upset, the only possible course for recovery is
re-initialization and restart. If a non-critical variable is upset,
recovery can be achieved through re-execution of a section, so
restart is not necessary. Since critical variables are actually
stored in triplicate, recovery can be performed by voting on their
value in the initialization section. Examples of critical
variables in the Intelsat VI ACE are offset pointing values, system
modes, and gains. Examples of non-critical variables are counters,
flags, loop variables, etc.
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error propagation control:
Error propagation control is an important problem in transient
error recovery. If a value which has been upset is used in a
calculation, all values which depend upon the upset value will be
incorrect. Consequently, one upset value may result in several
incorrect values, all of which must be corrected to successfully
perform recovery.
fault-tolerance:
Fault-tolerance is the ability of a system to perform correctly in
the presence of one or more hardware failures. Fault-tolerance
techniques use some form of hardware redundancy to detect and
replace failed units.
high-level errors:
The proposed transient error recovery methodology is capable of
detecting high-level errors. If an error cannot be detected by
redundancy at the high-level language level, it most likely cannot
be corrected by the methodology. An example of a high-level error
is an upset to a register in an ALU of a processor. Such an upset
can be observed by examining the processor registers. An example
of a low-level error, which the methodology cannot recover, is an
upset to the master reset flip-flop. A high-level language could
not observe such an error, since a master reset destroys all
program state.
High-Level Language/Machine Language Model:
The High-Level Language/Machine Language Model abstracts errors
from the Upset Mapping Model on bit level code (machine language)
and data as bit upsets on high-level language and data. The Upset
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Mapping Model is based on the observation that all results of the
Upset Mapping Model can be produced using a high-level language and
that Software Implemented Transient Error Recovery is only capable
of recovering from errors that can be detected from a high-level.
idempotence:
A procedure is idempotent if the result of multiple applications is
the same as the result of one application. An example of an
idempotent procedure is : move platform to 135 degrees. An example
of a non-idempotent procedure is : increment platform position
+ 15 degrees.
initialization section:
The section of code where the block initialization takes place. At
the very least, critical variables are voted upon and local
variables are initialized.
Intelsat VI ACE:
The Intelsat VI attitude control subsystem. This is the first
major satellite project to address the issue of recovering from
single event upsets by software techniques.
jump return to wait loop:
Jump return to wait loop is a method for detecting and recovering
from sequencing errors which occur during the execution of a wait
loop. The control program of a typical spacecraft sub-system will
spend the majority of its run-time in a wait loop. Since wait
loops are short, the number of mutations of the wait loop
instructions that a single bit flip could cause is small. Here is
an example of what could be done:
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; program fragment
104 add rl, r2
105 jmp 107
106 jmp 200
107 continue...
; wait loop
200 ei
201 jmp 200
202 jmp 200
Suppose an SEU changed line 200 from enable interrupt to jmp 106.
Under normal operation, it is impossible for the program to execute
line 106, since it is intentionally by-passed by line 105.
Consequently, embedding a jump return to the wait loop instruction
would recover from such an upset.
Since the amount of time spent in the wait loop is large, this
method is very effective in recovering from SEUs, but is
ineffective in recovering from larger upsets since mutations of
only one bit are considered.
machine code mis-interpretation:
Machine code mis-interpretation is caused from the ambiguity of
stored programs, since machine language is context sensitive. For
example, the machine code 10110001 may be interpreted as the
instruction "inc R1", or as the data BI hex. Consequently, if a
sequence error occurs, the code intended to detect this error may
be misinterpreted. This problem is solved with a process called
"NOP buffering".
Example: instead of compiling
If scc <> 5 then
goto errorrecovery;
as
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mov Ri, scc
mov Ri, 5
cmp
jne errorrecovery
use
nop
nop
mov R1, scc
mov Ri, 5
cmp
jne errorrecovery
The extra NOPs with put the program on the right track.
main memory:
Main bank of volatile RAM memory.
multiple bit upsets (MBU) :
The Multiple Bit Upset Model abstracts transient errors as events
in which one or more bits per word may be upset simultaneously. A
sub-class of MBUs are single event upsets (SEUs), which occur, by
definition, when only one bit per word is upset.
MBU Upset Rate:
The MBU upset rate refers to the frequency of upsets caused
primarily by the electrostatic discharge problem. There is no
accurate data available on the frequency characteristics of
electrostatic discharges. Since it is known that SEUs are the
dominant source of transient error in present spacecraft systems,
the MBU rate was chosen so that the frequency of catastrophic
upsets caused by MBUs is the same order of magnitude as the
frequency of catastrophic upsets caused by SEUs. The rate used
is 0.000001 upsets/(bit-day).
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processor memory:
Volatile memory used by the processor, whether internal or external
to the physical processor. In the context of the simulation
program, a "processor memory error" refers to a processor memory
error which can be observed by inspecting processor registers or
the program counter.
reasonableness checking:
Reasonableness checking is a method of error detection. When
a variable is known to have some range of correct values, then the
actual value of the variable can be compared to this range to check
the reasonableness of the value. If a discrepancy is found, an
error has occurred. Reasonableness checking is extremely powerful
when the range of correct values is small compared to the range of
possible values.
This technique is especially useful for testing program control
variables. For example, suppose we have the following code:
index := 0;
while index < 4 do
begin
index : index + 1;
{ etc. }
end;
We know that at the end of this block, index must have the value 4.
We also know that during the execution of this block, index cannot
have a value of less than 0 or greater than 4. Although this is
obvious, this example shows that the implementation of
reasonableness checking can be made very precise. Reasonableness
checking is similar to a process used in program correctness
verification called "assertion checking" [12].
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recovery block:
Once an error has been detected by a reasonableness check or
a sequence control check, appropriate recovery action is performed
by the recovery block. Although the recovery block could simply
reset the system, there is usually enough information to determine
the cause of the error and redo the appropriate section.
recovery format:
Recovery format refers to the software structure used for transient
error recovery.
recovery profile:
Recovery profile is one metric of recovery used in the simulation
program. The recovery profile is a histogram of the number of
detected errors for each error detection technique. The intention
of the recovery profile is to determine the relative value of error
detection techniques.
sections:
A section is the most basic unit of structure in the proposed
transient error recovery technique. An initialization section,
a computation section, and an action section together form a
computation block.
single event upsets (SEU):
A cause of error in digital electronics in spacecraft resulting
from exposure to high-energy cosmic particles. Because of their
small size, cosmic particles can result in at most one bit flip per
particle.
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SEU Upset Rate:
The SEU upset rate refers to the frequency of upsets caused by
cosmic radiation, based upon tests conducted upon actual devices
[3,11]. The upsets are assumed to occur in a constant stream,
which accurately models the real phenomenon. The rate used is
0.0001 upsets/(bit-day).
sequence control codes (SCC):
Sequence control codes are a method of sequence error detection.
A variable is set to a known value before a section is entered.
This variable is then checked at the end of the section. If there
is a discrepancy, entry into the section must have been at some
point other than the proper entry point of that section. SCCs are
a sub-class of reasonableness checking.
Structure/Content Model:
The Structure/Content Model abstracts software as having a recovery
structure without computational content. The Structure/Content
Model embodies the idea that the ability of a system to recover
from transient errors does not depend upon what computation is
being performed, but on how it is being performed. It is the
structure of a computation, and not its content per se, which
dictates the performance of Software Implemented Transient Error
Recovery. More specifically, the ability to perform error
propagation control, error detection, and error recovery upon the
initialization, computation, and action sections is independent of
the specific action performed in each section as long as the
idempotence and atomic action requirements are met.
133
An exception to this model is a non-idempotent action section.
The fact that an action is non-idempotent does not give one the
liberty to retry an action if a discrepancy is found. However,
any section which is idempotent, which includes all initialization
and computation sections, and most action sections, can be
repeated if necessary, so consequently, the specific content of the
section is irrelevant to recovery.
temporary variables:
All intermediate and final results of a computation section are
stored in temporary variables. This technique insures that all
computation sections are idempotent.
transient error:
Transient errors (as used in this paper) are errors that are
caused by phenomenon which are transient in nature, which occur
randomly, and are not caused by hardware failure. The system does
not have to prevent future occurrences of the same transient error
to recover. Consequently, transient hardware failures and
"transient" software failures do not cause transient errors as
defined above, because such errors do not usually occur randomly.
Example sources of transient error in spacecraft computers are
high-energy cosmic particles, electrostatic discharges, and thermal
noise.
upset:
A undesired bit flip occurring in volatile memory.
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Upset Mapping Model:
The Upset Mapping Model abstracts the outcome of multiple bit
upsets as either main memory errors, processor memory errors, or
processor sequence errors. Any upset outcome not modeled directly
by the above outcomes can either be modeled indirectly as a
combination of the above errors, or must be considered individually.
An example of a transient error which can be modeled as a
combination of the above events is an upset to an internal register
of the ALU of the processor, which results in either a processor
memory upset or a processor sequence upset. An example of an upset
which cannot be modeled by the above outcomes is an upset to the
master reset flip-flip.
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